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the conference was Akinwumi Adesina (President of the African Development Bank, 2017 World Food
Prize laureate, and Purdue alumnus). Over 200 persons from 20 countries, representing over 90 organizations, attended this conference that focused on how to best scale agricultural technologies and innovations to impact millions in the developing world. The objectives of the conference were to enhance
understanding of scaling up, establish a network among agricultural experts working in developing
countries, and aid in the spread of technologies that will feed our growing global population. Two major
conference participants and experts in the area of scale up, Larry Cooley and Julie Howard (see bios at
end of book), accepted the challenge to write this Scale Up Sourcebook, which is intended to capture
the spirit and content of the Scale Up Conference, continue the conversation on scale up, and serve as
a user guide on the topic.
—Suzanne Nielsen, Co-organizer of Scale Up Conference
and Project Manager for Scale Up Sourcebook
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FOREWORD

FOREWORD BY PRESIDENT
MITCHELL E. DANIELS, JR.
Few events could kick-off Purdue’s 150th Anniversary celebration quite like
the Scale Up Conference, which we were proud to host in partnership with the
African Development Bank in September 2018.
Celebrating our position as a leading land-grant university, the theme of our
yearlong celebration is “150 Years of Giant Leaps,” recalling Boilermaker
astronaut Neil Armstrong’s famous words upon the first moon landing 50
years ago. The theme also honors the footprints that Purdue alumni have left
across the U.S. and around the world, like those of Dr. Akinwumi Adesina,
keynote speaker at the Scale Up Conference. Dr. Adesina is president of the
African Development Bank and in 2017 became the most recent of three
World Food Prize winners whom Purdue proudly claims as alumni.
The Scale Up Conference tackled one of the most important topics in agriculture: leveraging globally the technology
and innovations designed to improve food security, nutrition, and livelihoods in the developing world. More than 200
people from 20 countries and some 90 organizations attended the conference, establishing a broad network among
agricultural experts committed to feeding our growing global population.
In his keynote, Dr. Adesina challenged attendees to find new ways to create impact through what he described as the
“Scaling Up Triangle”—strong and sustained political will, the power of science and technology, and suitable policy
incentives. A video recording of Dr. Adesina’s remarks and other featured presentations and panel discussions, photos,
and additional conference materials are available through Purdue e-Pubs (docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup).
In partnership with and through generous support from the African Development Bank, Purdue University has published
this Sourcebook on scaling agricultural innovation. Authored by Larry Cooley and Julie Howard, experts in international
development, the Sourcebook summarizes key insights, tools, examples, and references on designing for scale, assessing
scalability, financing the scaling process, and the effective use of partnerships to support scaling. It is intended for a broad
audience in academia, research institutions, governments, businesses, policy groups, and nongovernmental organizations
concerned with leveraging agricultural innovation to meet the needs of the developing nations.
Purdue is proud of the role its faculty and alumni have always played in conquering world hunger, and we hope this
guidebook serves you well in your efforts to do the same.
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FOREWORD BY PRESIDENT
AKINWUMI A. ADESINA
SCALE UP: A NECESSITY FOR TRANSFORMING
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
The African Development Bank was honored to co-organize the Scaling
Up Agricultural Technologies for Transformation conference with Purdue
University (my alma mater) on the occasion of Purdue’s 150th Anniversary
celebrations.
The “Giant Leaps” theme for the anniversary is consistent with my own conviction that now is the time for transforming agriculture into an engine of growth
for Africa’s economies and a pathway to prosperity for millions of its people.
All the conditions for African agriculture’s “Giant Leap” are in place: Africa
holds 65% of all the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and the technologies to transform this resource into a
breadbasket of healthy, nutritious food and finished agricultural products exist. What remains is a systematic process to
deploy these technologies and the required complementary services to millions of farmers, while stimulating value addition and unlocking regional and global markets.
This Sourcebook, distilling the incredible expertise, groundbreaking innovations, and examples of successful scale on
display at the conference, will surely serve as a valuable guide for those driven by the imperative to revolutionize African
agriculture.
As our own commitment to driving technologies at scale, the African Development Bank has launched a $1 billion initiative called “Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation” (TAAT)—in collaboration with our partners at the
World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and others.
TAAT is founded on the principles of the “Scaling Up Triangle” that I emphasized in my keynote address. These principles include the prerequisites of strong political will to ensure enabling infrastructure policies; harnessing innovations
in science and technology that are tailored to local conditions; and the alignment of incentives that unleash commercial profitability across the agriculture value chain . . . down to the smallholder farmer.
I believe that this Scale Up Sourcebook will accelerate initiatives that in turn scale up agricultural innovations such as TAAT
and many more. Harnessing these lessons and tools for concrete impact at scale requires continued and sustained investments across the board.
We must therefore all honor this commitment. We owe it to ourselves and generations to come to use every opportunity at
our disposal to make that Giant Leap of agricultural transformation in Africa a reality.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A decade ago, the audience for a discussion on “scaling”
international development initiatives could fit comfortably in a telephone booth. But times have changed. Today,
virtually every serious conversation about development
includes attention to strategies for achieving and sustaining results at scale; and there is an emerging body of literature, tools, case examples, and communities of practice
from which to learn.
This change reflects growing concern over the seemingly endless array of projects that fail to reach large numbers of the poor or to sustain outcomes over time, and the
mismatch between the magnitude of many of the world’s
most serious problems and the numerous but relatively
small donor resources arrayed against those problems.
Despite this growing recognition, major challenges
remain, including the need for fundamental changes in
established policies, procedures, and priorities of donor
agencies, national governments, researchers, and program
implementers. Most specifically, these changes imply a
reexamination of the current preoccupation with technological innovation and “pilot projects,” and a fundamental rethinking of ways to ensure that donor investments
are more likely to catalyze lasting, systemic change. This
reorientation requires (1) designing interventions with
scale in mind and with clear scaling strategies; (2) assessing and addressing obstacles to scalability; and (3) actively
managing the pathway to scale. The agriculture sector has
been slower than some other sectors, most notably health,
to incorporate these changes.
In an effort to close this gap, Purdue University organized a major conference in September 2018 on Innovations
in Agriculture: Scaling Up to Reach Millions, in partnership
with the African Development Bank. This Sourcebook is
informed and inspired by that conference and is intended
as an easy-to-use reference targeting a broad and diverse
audience drawn from host governments, research institutions, and academic, business, policy, and donor communities concerned with leveraging agricultural innovation to
meet the needs of the world’s poor.

The Sourcebook is divided into chapters addressing the
following issues: designing with scale in mind; assessing
scalability; using commercial markets to drive scaling;
financing the transition to scale; creating an enabling environment for scale; tailoring metrics, monitoring, and evaluation to support sustainable outcomes at scale; and the
critical role of intermediary and donor organizations. It is
designed to be a stand-alone source of guidance, tips, and
examples, and to provide links to additional resources for
readers wishing for more detail.
Also summarized in the Sourcebook are many of the
growing array of on-the-ground cases, donor practices, and
analytic tools that can help to inform future efforts to scale
agricultural interventions and outcomes.
The Sourcebook ends with a call to action and highlights
the following conclusions:
• Delivery at scale is not a gigantic project or a series
of projects. We need to plan for millions, not thousands; for uncontrolled, not controlled, settings;
for generations, not for five years; and for addressing, not working around, political and market
realities.
• This requires narrowing the gap between macro
goals and micro interventions by linking the
language and logic of projects to the language and
logic of development effectiveness.
• Development assistance can help, but it will not
solve the problem. Only markets and governments
can; and commercial markets should normally
be the default setting. Short-term interventions
(“projects”) and subsidies can make big and positive differences, especially in reaching underserved
smallholders and small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), but only if used strategically. They can also
introduce major distortions.
• It is essential to view agriculture as a business,
not a social sector; to treat farmers as businesses
and customers, not as beneficiaries; and to focus
vii

more attention on the full value chain, on finance,
on incentives, on the intermediation needed to
bring innovation to scale, and on the enabling
environment.
• New partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives
are essential for tackling scaling challenges.
• Initiatives must go beyond being “policy takers”
and play a much more proactive role in facilitating
policy change that can be a scaling force multiplier.
• There is rarely a straight line or a short journey
from research and innovation to validation and
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rollout. Adaptive management is an essential ingredient in all successful scaling efforts.
• The actions of research institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other implementing partners are shaped by donor policies,
metrics, and procedures. Systemic change, therefore, needs to give special attention to changes
in the funding priorities, internal incentives,
and operational procedures of those donor
institutions.

Introduction

Commercial flows far outstrip official development assistance, and it has been estimated that for every dollar of
official donor and philanthropic assistance to developing
countries, those same countries now spend 35 of their own
tax dollars.1 But there is increasing awareness that neither
the private sector acting alone and in its own interests, nor
governments continuing to do business as usual, will be
sufficient to solve some of the world’s most vexing development challenges.
Confronted with these realities, the development community is increasingly acknowledging that new types of
partnerships are needed, and that new technologies and
development interventions are likely to be material if and
only if they are designed and managed in ways that have
lasting effects on the incentives, policies, and practices of
governments and businesses.
There is much work to be done in systematizing
approaches to scaling and incorporating increased attention to the nontechnological forces that support—or
challenge—scaling efforts. Just as was done with topics
like monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and gender, this
work includes assembling useful tools, approaches, and
relevant experience, and mobilizing cadres of professionals—researchers, businesspeople, donors, and host government officials—who are comfortable using and building
on those advances.
The global conversation about reaching and sustaining
scale has been slow to infuse the discourse about agricultural development and food security. To bring these issues
to the forefront, Purdue University, in partnership with
the African Development Bank, organized a conference in
September 2018 on Innovations in Agriculture: Scaling Up to
Reach Millions. This Sourcebook is informed and inspired by
that conference, which, we believe, was an inflection point
in efforts to harness innovation for the benefit of those
who need it most.
The Sourcebook is intended as a consolidated reference and a foundation for future discussions about scaling

Intro Figure 1. Word cloud based on responses by Scale Up Conference attendees to the question, “What one word do you think
describes the biggest challenge for successful scale up of agri
cultural technologies/innovations in developing countries?”

agricultural interventions and innovations. The Sourcebook
suggests practical guidance for addressing each of the major
scaling considerations emphasized at the conference (Intro
Figure 1). While directed primarily to the agricultural sector, the document should also be relevant for those working on scaling development outcomes through commercial
pathways in other sectors.
The publication benefited greatly from the guidance
and project management provided by Suzanne Nielsen
of Purdue University and from thoughtful review and
substantive recommendations provided by the following
individuals: Shaun Ferris (Catholic Relief Services), Mark
Huisenga (United States Agency for International Development, USAID), Johannes Linn (Brookings Institution),
Maria Elena Mangiafico (International Fund for Agricultural Development, IFAD), Marc Schut (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, IITA), Simon Winter (Syngenta
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, SFSA), Lennart
Woltering (International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Center, CIMMYT), and Carolyn Woo (Purdue University).
Materials from the Purdue conference can be found
at https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/, including video
1

presentations from the conference, the complete set of
PowerPoint presentations, case study abstracts, and poster
abstracts. These materials and subsequent contributions will
be permanently hosted by the Community of Practice on
Scaling Development Outcomes (see Chapter 9 for details).
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Should readers have additional questions or be interested in
joining the Community of Practice, they are invited to reach
out to Larry Cooley, the principal author of this Sourcebook
and co-curator (with Johannes Linn) of the Community of
Practice, at lcooley@msi-inc.com.

CHAPTER 1

Designing Projects and Innovations
with Scale in Mind

Big problems demand big solutions, but too often entrepreneurs and development agencies find themselves
inventing, prototyping, and making modest investments in
promising technologies with no scaling strategy beyond a
hope that the best of these technologies will somehow find
their way to scale. On occasion, that strategy works, but
not often enough, with estimates that less than 5% of pilot
projects ever reach national scale.2
A growing body of experience suggests that it is possible to do much better by following a few rules for designing interventions, innovations, and technologies with scale
in mind.3
Scaling, as used here, is defined as “expanding, adapting
and sustaining successful interventions (policies, processes,
programs or projects) in different places and over time to
reach a greater number of people.”4 More specifically, we are
focusing on what some call “population-level” scale where
the reach of the intervention (the “numerator,” e.g., reduced
stunting of 5,000 children under the age of 5) must be evaluated in the context of the size of the problem or aspiration
(the “denominator,” e.g., a national aim of reducing stunting for 1 million children under the age of 5).
Projects focused on limited populations or proof of
concept are useful, particularly when they explicitly address
unanswered questions of key stakeholders and provide the
evidence needed to guide adaptation, simplification, and
advocacy. But too frequently, projects focus on perfecting
an innovation within a small, controlled setting rather
than on beginning with a vision of system-wide change
and how the project will help to get us there, as depicted
in Figure 1.1. Without that, “pilot project” is just a synonym for “small project” and research is likely to result in
“miracles on the shelf.”

Figure 1.1. Projects as Instruments of Change

In agriculture, there are only two platforms able to
reliably deliver goods, services, and technologies at population scale—governments and businesses, or a hybrid of
both. Unlike projects and donors, these two platforms are
predicated on operating at scale—delivering services at
“population level” in the case of governments, and reaching the “addressable market” in the case of businesses—
and are intended to sustain delivery of goods and services
over time. Scale and sustainability are part of their DNA.
Projects are, by contrast, designed to achieve discrete objectives over a fixed period of time, usually for a limited number of direct beneficiaries. Simply put, if an agricultural
project or innovation has no strategy for catalyzing a
lasting change in market conditions and/or government
services, it has no plan for achieving and sustaining outcomes at scale.
While it is impractical and wrong-headed to assume
that every intervention should be scaled or that everyone
should become a scaling expert, a serious focus on scaling
has implications throughout the research-to-results continuum. At a minimum, integrating a focus on scale into
agricultural research investments, prototypes, and pilot
3

projects includes thinking through a plausible pathway
to scale and designing the initial project or prototype to
advance that strategy by:
• Ensuring that the research/pilot/prototype generates evidence for advocacy, simplification, and
tailoring of the intervention;
• Identifying, involving, and working with the
intended large-scale implementers through multistakeholder initiatives;
• Focusing early on unit cost and implications of the
proposed change for existing businesses and current service providers; and
• Allowing for frequent adaptation and adjustment
based on market and client feedback.
There are several frameworks that can be used for
planning a pathway to scale and for assessing scalability.
One widely used framework consists of three steps and a
total of 10 tasks essential for planning and achieving scale
(Figure 1.2).5

This framework and others support scaling by detailing
the actions required for successful scaling, and by distinguishing a range of scaling strategies and their operational
implications. The analysis is elaborated in a separate publication that clarifies the considerations and implications
of pursuing scaling objectives in agriculture through commercial pathways.6
The following seven procedural guidelines or admonitions derived from these works have been shown to
enhance the scaling prospects of interventions and innovations that benefit the rural poor (i.e., “pro-poor” agricultural solutions).7
Guideline #1: Technological innovation is only one
part of the challenge. Focusing on supply chains, the business case, and the incentives for key players; overcoming
skepticism; strengthening key institutions and financing
mechanisms; and minimizing transition costs, are essential.
Guideline #2: Focus early on scale and on what’s
“beyond the project.” The linear approach of focusing
first on effectiveness, then on efficiency, and finally on
expansion will not work. By the time attention turns to

Figure 1.2. A Three-Step, 10-Task Management Framework for Scaling
4
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expansion, the innovation will likely be too complicated
or too expensive to scale, or it will be insufficiently attuned
to other market realities. Although it is challenging to do
so, early-stage innovators need to have one foot on the
accelerator at the same time as they have the other foot on
the brake—laying the groundwork for scaling while reserving judgment as to whether scaling is warranted.8 And
project designers and implementers need to plan from the
beginning for “What happens beyond the project or pilot
if it works?”
Since a principal role of pilot and demonstration projects is to generate the evidence, learning, and communication needed to make these kinds of decisions, a good rule
of thumb for pilot or R&D projects is to budget 20% of
total costs for these functions rather than the 5% typically
earmarked for monitoring and evaluation in conventional
development projects (see Chapter 6 for more on this topic).
Guideline #3: Think subtraction, not addition. As
you develop and refine an innovation, do not just think
about how to make it better; think at every stage about how
to make it simpler, cheaper, and more compatible with the
procedures and incentives of the provider you hope will
deliver it at scale.
Guideline #4: Link scale and sustainability. “Sustainability”—the continuation of services and outcomes
over time—should be inextricably linked to the concept of
scale. Every time a project discusses scale, someone should
ask, “Yes, but is it sustainable?” Every time a project discusses sustainability, someone should ask, “Yes, but at what
scale?”
Guideline #5: Expect and plan for iteration. The pathway from innovation to scale, even when successful, takes an
average of 15 years9 and involves multiple changes in intervention design and scaling strategy along the way. A capacity for course correction is typically more important than a
perfect plan. This puts a premium on establishing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems designed to inform these
changes and negotiating as much flexibility as possible with
funders and partners. (See Chapter 6 for more.)

Guideline #6: Prioritize intermediation. Scaling propoor agricultural solutions requires a wide range of supporting activities. Included in this “intermediation” are functions
such as convening key stakeholders, investment packaging,
syndication, and garnering support for policy change. In
high-end commercial markets (including high-margin markets in low-income countries, as discussed in Chapter 3),
these functions are performed by venture capitalists, investment bankers, and specialized consultants. At the bottom of
the pyramid, these functions often fall between the cracks.
When designing projects and interventions aimed at scaling
for these markets, designers and funders, as part of their due
diligence, need to take special care to ensure that capacity
and funding exist to perform these functions (see Chapter 7
for more on this topic).
Guideline #7: Someone has to drive. Scaling of propoor outcomes almost never occurs spontaneously, and it
will rarely succeed without the determined leadership of
people who are able to garner substantial resources and
support, are deeply committed to the change, and are willing to stick with the effort over time. But change can begin
anywhere and is more likely if everyone has an eye on scale
from the outset. While it may be unrealistic, for example,
to expect innovators and researchers to drive change from
their labs or workshops, their focus on workable solutions to real problems and on plausible pathways to scale
can be an essential ingredient in turning aspirations into
outcomes.
One way of increasing attention to the array of scaling
considerations noted in this chapter is by incorporating a
scaling plan as a component of—or companion to—project
and grant proposals. Rather than focusing on an intervention’s technical theory of change (i.e., how the intervention
or innovation is expected to work), these plans highlight
how the project is expected to lead to change in the larger
system—what some have termed a “second theory of
change” or “theory of scaling.”10 See Management System
International’s (MSI) guidelines for one suggested format
for scaling plans,11 available at http://tinyurl.com/yxt6wen9.

Designing Projects and Innovations with Scale in Mind  |
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CHAPTER 2

Assessing Scalability

As noted in Chapter 1, assessing the potential for reaching
and delivering at scale is hard-wired into the business models and incentives of private companies and government
service agencies, both of which are motivated to operate
at a scale dictated by the size of the need or market, and to
satisfy those needs over the long run. This is quite different
from the incentives and business models of organizations
that fund or implement activities on a project basis and
that, therefore, are focused from the outset on defined targets and deliverables, fixed implementation periods, and
clear exit strategies. For most project-based organizations,
adopting a scaling mentality thus requires major shifts in
organizational systems, procedures, incentives, and mindsets. Often this change begins by institutionalizing some
kind of “scaling scan,” “scaling readiness,” or “scalability
assessment” at the project or transaction level.
The purpose of “scalability assessment” is to identify as
early as possible the upside prospects and likely challenges
that will be faced in scaling a specific service, innovation,
approach, or product. Doing this systematically allows
everyone involved to make informed decisions about
whether and how to proceed, and to take specific steps to
mitigate potential scaling obstacles.
Analyzing scalability requires careful analysis of four
interlocking elements: (1) characteristics of the innovation
or intervention; (2) characteristics of the organization(s)
that would deliver it at scale and that would support the
scaling effort; (3) characteristics of the prevailing policy
regime and other enabling or constraining conditions; and
(4) contextual factors such as the homogeneity or diversity
of potential adopters (Figure 2.1).12
Some of the first efforts to address scalability used costbenefit and cost-effectiveness analysis as principal tools.13
More recently, there have been several efforts to formalize
the process of scalability assessment and, subsequently, to
6

Figure 2.1. Four Dimensions of Scalability Assessment

adapt and apply systematic scalability assessment to propoor agricultural interventions and innovations.
Typical of these efforts is a 32-item scalability assessment checklist,14 available at http://tinyurl.com/yxlqgmfd,
that has been applied as a decision-support and planning
tool in a variety of sectors and countries since 2006. That
checklist was recently adapted and elaborated for application to pro-poor agricultural innovation. The adapted
instrument, the Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool
(ASAT),15 available at https://bit.ly/2UaZ1B5, includes 37
factors related to (1) the importance of the innovation; (2)
its credibility and observability; (3) the ease with which
it can be tried, purchased, adopted, and implemented by
potential adopters; (4) the benefits and business case for
potential adopters; (5) the business case for other supply
chain actors and the strength of the underlying market system; and (6) the enabling environment.16
Given the subjective nature of some of its elements, the
ASAT is most useful when applied by diverse stakeholders
in a facilitated process. Since each of the 37 factors in the

index can be addressed through policy or programmatic
actions, the tool is more appropriately used as a basis for
modifying or adjusting scaling strategies than as a “scorecard” for determining the feasibility of an intervention or
innovation reaching scale.
A second tool emerging from USAID–sponsored
research is a “decision tree” intended to assess the feasibility and suitability of private sector, public sector, and
hybrid scaling pathways for each of six key functions
involved in scaling agriculture, namely: production, distribution, incentives, demand creation, training/support, and
overall leadership of the scaling process.17
In search of a simple-to-apply method of assessing
scalability, the CIMMYT collaborated with the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) to develop a tool
intended to help researchers and project leaders conduct
self-assessments of their scaling plans, aspirations, and
prospects—what the authors term a “scalability scan.” Like
the ASAT, this tool is designed to be used in a moderated
workshop setting. Users are guided through three steps: (1)
construct your scaling ambition; (2) assess scaling ingredients; and (3) list and respond to critical concerns. Step
2, the scaling assessment, is organized around 10 “scaling
ingredients” as shown in Figure 2.2.18

With similar aspirations, Wageningen University and the
IITA have developed a methodology called “Scaling Readiness.” Building on a NASA framework for assessing Technology Readiness,19 Scaling Readiness was developed under the
CGIAR (Consortium of International Agricultural Research
Centers) Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas.
It uses scientifically based methods and tools to (1) characterize and unpack agricultural innovations, (2) diagnose
the readiness of the innovation to scale, (3) develop scaling
strategies, (4) support stakeholder selection and action to
overcome bottlenecks to scaling, and (5) navigate whether
investments have resulted in the desired effect through monitoring, evaluation, and learning. Scaling Readiness has been
used by research, development, and donor organizations in
12 countries.20
Other recent contributions on scalability assessment
include a book by the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) on the science of scaling, Ann Mei Chang’s
book Lean Impact, and a publication by Lennart Woltering
and colleagues on the “scaling mindset.”21
A final noteworthy methodology comes from IFAD,
which has been particularly ambitious in its efforts to integrate scaling as a central element in all aspects of its operations. Building on a conceptual framework for scaling up

Technology / Practice

Public Sector
Governance

Awareness
and Demand

Business
Cases

Leadership and
Management

Value
Chain

Evidence
and Learning

Collaboration

Finance

Knowledge and Skills

Figure 2.2. The Scaling Scan—10 Scaling Ingredients
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developed in partnership with the Brookings Institution
(see Chapter 7), IFAD elaborated an Operational Framework
for Scaling Up Results.22 The framework provides guidance
on how to systematically consider scaling up in IFAD’s
operations, from inception to completion, and in different contexts. It suggests specific guiding questions for the
different stages of the project cycle related to “Vision, Strategy, and Implementing the Scaling Up Process” that probe
threshold considerations on scaling.
This approach has been further adapted in an operational scaling assessment framework and toolkit developed under the auspices of the International Development
Innovation Alliance (IDIA), a grouping of 12 major development finance institutions focused on supporting innovation for development impact at scale.23
A growing number of cases document the use of these
various scalability assessment tools. Notable among these
are five detailed case studies on market-based scaling of
agricultural innovation,24 five applications of the ASAT,25
four case studies of “scaling readiness,”26 and a variety of
cases presented at the 2018 Purdue conference on scaling
agricultural innovation.27

Box 2.1. Case Studies of Scaling
Through Commercial Pathways
USAID’s Bureau for Food Security commissioned
in-depth case studies of pro-poor agricultural
innovations scaled through commercial pathways, including:
o
o
o
o
o

Hybrid maize in Southern Zambia;
Irrigated Sahel rice in the Senegal River
Valley;
Low-cost agricultural machinery in
Southwest Bangladesh;
Purdue Improved Crop Storage (PICS)
bags in Kenya; and
Kuroiler chickens in Uganda.

The results—available in a series of case
reports28 and synthesis documents29—contributed directly to the development of the Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool (ASAT30) and
decision tree methodology presented in this
Sourcebook.
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Among many insights emerging from the cases are the
following:
• There is no such thing as a fully “commercial” pathway to scale; government policies, regulations, and
subsidies play central roles in scaling all agricultural
interventions.
• Successful commercial scaling requires forming
partnerships that go well beyond the traditional
concept of “implementing partners” to include key
value chain actors such as equipment leasing, input
provision, and product aggregation enterprises.
• Scaling works best when changes are tangible,
familiar, and easy to bundle and unbundle.
• Information technology has rapidly accelerated
and fundamentally altered some pathways to scale.
• The most vexing bottlenecks for scaling of innovations are usually nontechnological in nature (e.g.,
access to markets, enabling policies, seed systems,
access to finance).
• Poor farmers’ time horizons tend to be extremely
short; they cannot afford a mistake and therefore
tend to place a higher priority on minimizing risk
than on maximizing reward.
• Monopoly and/or monopsony are sometimes useful in the short run to build effective and efficient
supply chains, but often present challenges later.
• It is usually more effective for strategies and projects to avoid mandating the choice of local partners
and prespecifying the sequencing of actions.
While the development and use of scalability assessment tools for pro-poor agricultural interventions are still
relatively new, there is a growing recognition that project
planning and applied research design should both include
some form of “scalability screen.” The tools noted above
provide a foundation for that analysis and for deeper discussion among stakeholders on the most appropriate scaling strategy to adopt.

CHAPTER 3

Using Commercial Markets to Drive Scaling

Because functioning markets are critical for creating population-level impact, it is essential that researchers working
on technological improvements engage with relevant private entities at an early stage in the research process. These
private sector representatives—small agribusinesses, cooperatives, input dealers, wholesalers, retailers, processors,
equipment leasing firms, and food service companies—can
provide timely feedback to steer the development of the
technology, partner on demonstrations, and, once the technology is launched, play a critical role in sustainably scaling technology adoption.
The prevailing gulf between publicly financed research
and markets is due partly to the fact that private sector
investment in agriculture has been viewed with suspicion
until recently in many low-income countries. Governments
often assumed monopolistic roles for major inputs and
commodities, cast as a protection for ordinary producers
and consumers from market fluctuations and unscrupulous private sector actors.
With the global debt crisis of the 1980s, many of these
government interventions were no longer tenable. Structural adjustment lending programs were frequently conditioned on government commitments to liberalize major
markets, including agricultural markets. Donor agencies
began to work with host country governments and private sector investors to develop and strengthen agricultural
value chains and markets, but rarely were these programs
systematically linked to research and technology development activities. In his keynote address31 at the Purdue
conference, Akin Adesina recounted his excitement about
bringing new high-yielding varieties of sorghum to farmers as a postdoctoral researcher at the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
“But,” asked the farmers, “will ICRISAT buy the sorghum?”
In other words—innovation is great, but where is the

market? Technologies must be profitable, and there must
be a buyer for the additional production.
A growing body of experience highlights the following
four major insights regarding the role of markets to achieve
scaling:
Address gaps in value chains to improve the economics of technology adoption. Several cases examined in a
USAID-funded assessment of scaling through commercial
markets feature examples of technologies that sat on a shelf
for years because key parts of the value chains were missing.
These include Senegal Sahel high-yielding irrigated rice varieties that were introduced in the 1990s but did not take off
until the 2010s, when they were included as part of donorand government-supported value chain innovations to
improve the production of certified quality rice seed; extend
good agricultural practices; strengthen capacities to supply
inputs, services, and downstream market linkages; and access
finance.32 The critical role of government policies in facilitating Senegal rice adoption, including guaranteeing farmer
prices above production costs, is discussed in Chapter 5.
Similarly, PICS (Purdue Improved Crop Storage)
technology, featuring triple-layer bags that provide a hermetic seal against pests, was developed in the late 1980s
in Cameroon through USAID-funded research.33 But PICS
bags did not begin to scale until 2007, following an economic analysis by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
that determined, because of the high cost of imported PICS
bags, that developing local manufacturers and suppliers
would be critical to bring down PICS bag costs and make
their adoption more attractive. Today PICS bags are in use
in more than 30 countries in Africa and Asia.
Focus on strengthening local capacity and companies
to solve the “missing middle” problem. In low-income
countries, there are large gaps in access to agricultural market services. The small group of fully commercial farmers
9

are reached by the larger international and regional seed
companies and machinery providers, for example, while
the vast majority of semicommercial and subsistence farmers largely rely on saved seed and operate with animal and
people-powered equipment.
Promising models to reach underserved farmers who
are transitioning from subsistence to semicommercial farming focus on strengthening local companies and capacity.
In the PICS case, filling the “missing middle” to improve
smallholder access to better postharvest storage involved
developing local manufacturing capacity, a dealership network, and innovative marketing strategies for selling bags
in small quantities. Local manufacturers of burlap bags
and other woven products, for example Pee Pee Limited of
Tanzania, were trained to manufacture a different, higher
quality bag than the ones they were producing previously.
Activities to incentivize the local manufacture of bags were
combined with community-level demonstrations and
innovative programs to generate demand and attract local
vendors to sell the bags, including established agro-input
shops, women, and youth.34
The Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) of the
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) worked
to strengthen local research and seed value chain capacity
at several levels. Critically, the PASS model focused not only
on building the capacity of different value chain nodes, but
also on purposefully linking the nodes. Efforts included
building local university capacity to produce plant breeders; developing the technical and managerial capacity of
African seed companies from the “ground up” to produce
high-quality seed at scale; facilitating links between breeders and companies; and developing local seed marketing
outlets close to farmers.35
Seeds for Impact, a partnership between AGRA, the
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), and Syngenta
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture (SFSA), launched
in late 2018, will leverage the progress by PASS and similar
initiatives to provide small, growing seed companies with a
mix of grants, loans, and technical assistance to scale faster.36
Both the PICS and PASS programs demonstrate that
building local capacity is often a long, slow, and costly
process. These efforts have been underway for well over a
decade, a much longer timeframe than many project-based
donors have been willing to support. Monitoring and
evaluation efforts are usually focused on more immediate
“outputs” rather than indicators of market development
and sustainable impacts over a longer time horizon (see
Chapter 6). Progress in developing local capacity may only
manifest its full effects years after the project’s close.
10
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Increase smallholder access to markets and lower the
costs of capital-intensive inputs and services by working through local service providers, franchise systems,
and membership groups, and by harnessing technology.
The comparatively large expense of agricultural machinery,
especially for use on small tracts of land for limited periods
of the year, combined with difficulties in accessing finance
for fixed capital (see Chapter 4), has severely limited the
adoption of agricultural mechanization by smallholders. In Bangladesh, the Cereal Systems Initiative for South
Asia—Mechanization and Irrigation (CSISA-MI) project
addressed this challenge by developing a model in which a
local service provider (LSP) provides machinery services to
the community. LSPs are key farmers with adequate capital, entrepreneurship, and business skills to buy a machine,
which they use on their own land and then provide services
for a fee to neighbors during the rest of the season.37
Babban Gona’s38 model in Nigeria and One Acre Fund39
in East Africa both address economies of scale challenges
by providing farmer members or franchisees with access to
markets, negotiated prices, and technical advice. Hello Tractor,40 operating in several African countries, has introduced
an innovative “Uber for tractors” concept that uses information and communication technologies (ICT) to connect farm
machinery owners with smallholders desiring mechanized
services. The objective is to increase the efficiency of machine
use and reduce unit costs in order to facilitate much wider
adoption of mechanization. Farmers can book services via
an app or a local Hello Tractor agent. Requests are validated,
aggregated geographically, and scheduled. Tractors are fitted
with remote tracking devices so that Hello Tractor and tractor
owners are able to track location and usage at all times.
Encourage private sector collaboration on extension. Private companies are embracing new functions to
fill in missing pieces of the value chain, build a longerterm relationship with customers, and ensure quality, often
leveraging ICT. Over the years, funding for public extension
services in low-income countries has declined, and local
agro-dealers are beginning to step in to provide various
services. These include organizing community-level demonstration plots where farmers can see the impact of technologies close up. In Egypt, BASF created a mobile clinic,
operating on market days, where farmers can bring their
diseased plants and receive advice. BASF, Bayer, and others also make extension advice available by phone through
interactive voice messages or through Internet sites. Product stickers on bags of fertilizer, seed, and chemicals provide phone or Internet contact information through which
customers can check lot numbers and avoid fake products.

Locating the Cases in
the Scaling Framework
Relating these case examples to the three-step scaling framework described in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.2) raises critical strategy, monitoring, policy, and timeframe questions related to
Step 2 of the framework, Establishing the Preconditions for
Scaling, and Step 3, Implementing the Scaling Up Process.
Like many promising agricultural interventions and innovations funded through projects, each of these cases struggled
to carry out the foundational tasks included in Step 2 of the
framework. But unlike most, each of these cases found a way
to progress toward significant scale. Now, as each faces the
operational tasks associated with Step 3, there are an array
of new challenges relating to the development of profitable
and competitive market solutions for the provision of inputs,
equipment, and/or distribution and sales at scale (see below).
Limitations regarding the financing of scale and the enabling
environment for scaling are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Senegal Sahel rice and PICS bags are clearly in Step 3
(Implementing the Scaling Up Process). Both initiatives have
benefited from strong government and/or donor support
for organizational innovations and coordination to connect
smallholders to critical technologies and markets, and, in the
case of PICS bags, to create local manufacturing capacity. Questions related to government support and the sustainability of
Senegal Sahel rice adoption will be discussed in Chapter 5.
The spread of PICS bags appears to be more clearly on
the path to sustainability over the long term without external
support. Locally manufactured bags are generally lower cost
and of competitive quality with imported competitors, and
the private sector is continuing to evolve bag design and marketing innovations with diminishing reliance on program
support. However, as PICS bags become a dispersed private
sector product rather than a project output, monitoring will
become more difficult. Adoption rates, costs of manufacture
and distribution, and determining the point at which population-scale, sustained scaling is reached in a given country
or region will be hard to determine, particularly if no specific
external assessment efforts are put into place.
PASS is in the latter stages of Step 2 (Establishing the
Preconditions for Scaling) and appears to have achieved
the desired result of committed adopters and resources
allocated for going to scale. The nature and level of competition in producing quality seed, and the ultimate scale
potential of the effort, remain to be determined. PASS
has now been folded into a new program, Partnership for
Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA).
Tracking progress in Step 3 toward sustainable scaling will

require monitoring PIATA as well as affiliated programs
that build on PASS such as Seeds for Impact—in short, a
much different approach to monitoring (see Chapter 6).

Takeaways
Several key points emerge from this analysis with respect
to the use of commercial markets to drive pro-poor scaling:
• Government and/or donor action is often required
to promote inclusive market development when the
private sector is unwilling or unable to absorb the
costs of reaching remote and dispersed smallholders.
• Commercial markets are inherently volatile. In
seeking scale, donors and governments should be
sensitive to the risks faced by those who live on the
margin, and seek measures to offset some of that
risk without creating moral hazard.
• Engaging with markets is critical for creating
population-level impact, but most smallholders
have limited access to reliable input or commodity markets. Resources and patience are required to
launch or strengthen local entities that can provide,
and sustain, services to underserved rural areas.
• Effective support for pro-poor agricultural innovation often includes collaboration with, and
assistance for, the nonfarming businesses and
organizations, e.g., bag manufacturers and universities, that are vital to filling the gaps and developing
viable agricultural value chains.
• Working through local service providers, franchise
and membership groups can help to aggregate
demand and reduce the costs of providing capitalintensive inputs and market services to remote
smallholders.
• There is considerable scope for local agro-input
dealers and service providers to offer quality extension and product verification services to small
holders to fill the gap left by diminished support
for public extension.
• Although often needed to jump-start change, sustained public or external support also carries risks of
dependence, or may inadvertently crowd out other
private sector investors. Similarly, temporary monopolies are sometimes necessary to create investment
incentives and economies of scale, but planning
should include a strategy for encouraging competitive markets over time at all stages of the value chain.
Using Commercial Markets to Drive Scaling
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CHAPTER 4

Financing the Transition to Scale

Scaling impact in agriculture requires investment at scale,
but where will the money come from? Commercial banks
have been famously reluctant to lend to the sector. In
Africa, an estimated 1% of commercial bank loans go to
agriculture.41 Globally, the unmet demand for smallholder
finance is estimated at $200 billion.42 A World Bank survey
of commercial lending in Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire,
and Sierra Leone found that most lending for agribusiness
was short-term and did not match borrower needs, particularly investment capital requirements for farm machinery,
nonfarm assets, and industrial property. Banks mainly
financed off-farm value chain activities, including processing and marketing, and avoided lending to smallholder
farmers except where they were organized into cooperatives
or producer organizations.43

Why Is Commercial Bank Lending
to Small and Medium Enterprise
(SME) Agribusiness so Low?
Commercial banks perceive agricultural value chain activities
as relatively high risk, high cost, and low margin compared
to other sectors. Production can be devastated by droughts,
floods, pests, and diseases. Input and commodity markets
can be affected by price volatility and logistics challenges.
Legal issues, including land tenure and contract enforcement, also add risk and costs. Providing financial services
through regular brick and mortar banking facilities to widely
dispersed farmers and agribusinesses is costly. In addition,
banks often cite their lack of in-house technical expertise
and inability to assess agriculture-related risks as a key reason for the low level of finance to the sector. When commercial bank financing is available, interest rates are often
prohibitively high for smallholders and SME agribusinesses.
12

To deal with the chronic lack of funding for agriculture
from the commercial sector, the agriculture sector has traditionally turned to government for subsidies, and to donor
and development finance institutions for investments in
agricultural development projects. However, the level of
public funding delivered through individual projects in this
way has been inadequate to support scaling up, and publiconly financing is unsustainable over the long term.
The following sections review some of the emerging
public and private sector innovations that are beginning to
offset risks and increase financial flows to the agricultural
sector from commercial banks and newer financial actors.
The financing channels—by themselves or in different combinations as blended financing—offer funding, repayment
terms that are tailored to specific situations, and, increasingly, ongoing management and technical advice.
The financial sector innovations described below are
generally at the nascent stage. While there are an increasing
number of examples on the ground, implementation and
learning tend to be siloed, with limited resources for innovation and few platforms for sharing across organizations.
An exception and potential model is the Council on Smallholder Agricultural Finance, an alliance of social lending
institutions targeting “missing middle” agricultural businesses in low- and middle-income countries. Established in
2012, the alliance provides a platform for members to convene on a precompetitive basis to share learning, identify
best practices, and develop industry standards related to
market growth, responsible lending principles, and social
and environmental impact.44
Even the most innovative partnerships and mechanisms, however, will be limited by the policies, regulations,
and services provided by the government (see Chapter 5).
These include contract enforcement, laws and regulations affecting input and commodity trade, and policies

governing land tenure, as well as levels of corruption that
can discourage private sector investment.
In the early stages of developing an innovation and
scaling pathway, lead scaling partners should review the
landscape of financial partners and programs that have
aligned interests and/or are already operating in the target
region(s). Prospective financial partners for scaling should
be engaged at an early stage—even if their funding is not
needed until later—so that these partners can help to shape
the program as it develops and ready it for larger financing
streams.
The remainder of this chapter reviews a range of risk
mitigation and capital mobilization mechanisms intended
to increase the financing available to scale up pro-poor
agricultural innovation.

Risk Mitigation
Traditional loan collateral requirements, including land or
building titles, are often difficult or impossible for smallholders to obtain. Warehouse receipt systems (WRS) enable
farmers and agribusinesses to use stored commodities in
lieu of traditional collateral for finance. Long-established
WRS exist in the United States, across Latin America and
Western Europe, and in China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In WRS, the farmer deposits a quantity of agricultural products in a licensed warehouse. The warehouse
then issues a receipt that can be retained for later sale of
the commodity or used as collateral for finance.
Donor programs to help develop WRS and link their
use to credit guarantee funds have expanded farmer access
to financing in some countries,45, 46 but overall their use in
low-income countries remains limited.47 While a number
of countries have developed legislation that enables warehouse receipts to be used as legal collateral, it has proved
more difficult for low-income countries to meet broader
system-level requirements, including a reliable network
of licensed warehouses that are regularly inspected, competently managed to maintain the quality of stored commodities, and insured.48
Traditional insurance. Agricultural insurance is used by
producers and their financial partners to mitigate unpreventable risks at the production level and throughout the
value chain. Financial partners for scale up investments
may require programs to acquire insurance against producer risk as a prerequisite for financing approval, and/
or may seek additional insurance themselves. Agricultural
insurance is common in industrialized countries, but its

use in low-income countries remains low. A 2012 World
Bank study found that only one-third of middle- and lowincome countries offer agricultural insurance products.49
Even when such products are available, utilization may be
low because of the expense or the lack of confidence by
banks and farmers in the overall system.50
Index-based insurance. In recent years, the development
of advanced agricultural risk modeling techniques and
the emergence of insurance pools and index-based insurance have sparked new interest in agricultural insurance.
In contrast to traditional insurance, which assesses risks
and claims on an individual basis, index-based insurance
is based on measuring an objective parameter(s) that is
highly correlated with actual losses sustained by farmers or
herders.51 For example, the insurance payout scale may be
agreed to in advance, based on rainfall levels recorded at
a given weather station. In aggregate index insurance, the
payouts are based on an index developed from aggregated
statistics of farm production in a defined geographic area,
for example, crop yield estimates.52
Index insurance has increased in popularity, and today
tens of millions of farmers in India and a growing number
of farmers and herders in Africa are thought to be insured
through these programs.53 Their popularity is due in part
to the potential to address systemic catastrophic risks,
including widespread drought. Available evidence suggests
that farming households with index insurance increase
their investments in production and in some cases make
riskier production choices, both critical to advance scaling
of agricultural innovations.54 The International Livestock
Research Institute (ILRI) pioneered the adaptation of index
insurance for livestock herders in drought-prone areas.55
However, a 2018 stock-taking study by ISF Advisors
found that while index insurance shows great potential, it
is not yet at a mature enough point for innovations to scale
and graduate from donor assistance. There are issues to
be overcome at different nodes: from smallholder farmers
who have difficulty understanding, trusting, and affording
products; to aggregators and intermediaries who lack experience and resources to deal with a range of complex tasks;
to global reinsurers faced with a very small market; and to
governments attempting to fit these products into broader
national insurance policies and programs. The World Bank,
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and other
development partners are focusing on the development of
effective, sustainable markets for index-based weather and
catastrophic risk insurance through the Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF).56 But there is a need for broader industrywide collaboration and a platform similar to the Council
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on Smallholder Agricultural Finance to facilitate ongoing
innovation, testing and prototypes, improvements in the
regulatory and enabling environment at national levels, and
cross-organization sharing, learning, and investment.57
Credit guarantee funds, usually provided by governments
or development organizations, make commercial lending
more attractive by sharing or absorbing the risks of lending
to the target sector, value chain, or enterprise type. Credit
guarantees provided by the Alliance for a Green Revolution
in Africa (AGRA), the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), the World Bank, and other partners
have motivated local banks to make loans to agro-input dealers, small-scale farmers, and other SMEs in several African
countries. AGRA reports that $17 million in loan guarantees
leveraged $160 million in low-interest loans from commercial banks in five African countries.58 The Africa Guarantee
Fund for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises,59 funded by
the African Development Bank in partnership with Denmark
and Spain, provides partial credit guarantees and funding to
help financial institutions develop their capacity to manage
SME portfolios.
The Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for
Agricultural Lending60 (NIRSAL), initiated by the Central
Bank of Nigeria in 2011 with seed capital of USD $500 million, is the largest government-run program of its kind in
Africa. In addition to credit guarantees, NIRSAL provides
insurance and technical assistance to banks with the objective of increasing commercial lending to agriculture from
2% to 7% of the overall portfolio within 10 years. Between
2012 and 2015, NIRSAL provided credit guarantees for more
than 450 agricultural projects valued at $170 million.61

Innovative Finance
Blended finance is the combination of funding from a range
of capital providers (including, but not limited to, commercial banks) with differing financial and social objectives. Blended finance partners might include development
agencies or other philanthropic funds anticipating a negative financial rate of return, and other funders seeking
capital preservation, below-market, or market rate returns.
Blended finance approaches are typically used to “attract
capital for investments addressing market failures and
delivering substantial social and/or environmental impact
in emerging and frontier markets.”62
Blended finance mechanisms have become increasingly popular and can provide important opportunities for
scalable innovations to gain access to finance. According
14
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to a World Economic Forum survey of 74 blended finance
vehicles, each dollar of grant funding invested typically
attracts $1–20 in private investment.63 There are many
types of blended finance instruments, often packaged in
different ways to meet the requirements of a specific opportunity and group of investors.
In structured finance agreements, public or philanthropic
investors agree to absorb “first losses” to protect private
investors in case the financed program fails to perform as
expected and investors cannot be repaid. For example, in
the Africa Agriculture Trade and Investment Fund (AATIF),64
a $146 million fund that invests in African agriculture, the
first two tiers of shareholders, the German Ministry of Development and Deutsche Bank, agree to absorb losses before
the third tier—composed of private investors—is hit. This
means that losses would have to exceed 50 percent of the
fund’s value before private investors were harmed.65
Another example of structured finance comes from
Root Capital, a social impact investor (see the following
section) specializing in providing financial access to underserved smallholders and SMEs in low-income countries.66
In response to a devastating outbreak of coffee leaf rust
affecting millions of coffee farmers in Latin America beginning in 2012, Root Capital mobilized partners from across
the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to co-design the
Coffee Farmer Resilience Initiative (CFRI).67 CFRI is funded
with a blend of below-market-rate capital, including lowcost debt, catalytic credit enhancements, and grant funding. Several tiers of partners were recruited to support the
program. The Ford Foundation, the Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund (IDB-MIF),
and Starbucks Coffee Company made long-term investments (7–10 years) of $12.5 million in Root Capital to
support coffee farm renovation and rehabilitation-related
lending. Keurig Green Mountain and USAID provided firstloss capital and other forms of credit guarantees.
USAID also provided an additional $2 million in grant
funding under the Global Development Alliance to mobilize funding and partnerships from several specialty private sector roasters, who channeled funding for technical
assistance to their suppliers to reach over 40,000 farmers.
Support from other donors covered the costs of program
design, financial management training, ICT activities, and
impact assessment.
Agribusiness investors and agricultural investment funds.
Investments by foreign agribusiness firms in low-income
country agricultural sectors provide important sources of
finance as well as technical assistance. Governments and
donor agencies often partner with multinational firms in

these investments to supplement resources for technical
assistance and ensure greater inclusion of smallholders.
Olam’s rice investment in Nasarawa State, Nigeria provides one example. Olam established Ondorie Nucleus
Rice Farm, a 10,000-hectare irrigated rice farm, and a stateof-the-art mechanized rice milling and parboiling facility
with the capacity to process 105,000 MT rice/year. The rice
is sourced from the nucleus farm and from smallholder
outgrower networks in communities across three states.
Farmers are being supported with group formation, training, and agricultural inputs on credit to improve their production. They also benefit from a guaranteed buyer system.
Grant and financing partners include the federal government of Nigeria, the Commercial Bank of Nigeria, IFAD,
and USAID/Nigeria.68 From a starting base of 30 farmers
in 2015, the partnership by 2017 had expanded to nearly
5,000 farmers. During this period Olam purchased over
25,000 MT of rice from smallholders for $9.8 million. The
partnership also created 3,800 off-farm value chain–related
jobs, primarily for youth and women.69
The Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program (AMSAP)
is another example of a public-private agribusiness investment, here including USAID, DuPont Pioneer (now Corteva Agriscience), and the Government of Ethiopia. In
AMSAP, USAID offered a dollar for dollar grant matching
program that leveraged a $2 million contribution from
DuPont. The program’s goal was to improve the yields,
incomes, and nutritional outcomes of more than 100,000
smallholder farmers across three regions of Ethiopia. ACDI/
VOCA provided technical assistance to develop demonstration plots and field training sessions, and strengthened a
network of agro-input dealers and cooperatives to advance
the adoption of improved inputs and production techniques. By the end of 2016, two years before the program’s
end, over 250,000 smallholders had adopted new technology. Participating farmers achieved a threefold increase in
maize yields and boosted their annual incomes by as much
as $1,500.70, 71
Agricultural investment funds combine capital resources
from different types of investors for on-lending to, or investment in, agricultural enterprises. Through these pooled
resources, the funds offer diversified investments and vehicles that help manage investors’ risks.72 The investment
funds utilize a range of instruments to provide capital to
agribusinesses, including equity, debt, and guarantees. They
also provide specialized technical and management expertise to support clients and improve investment performance.
Many agribusiness investment funds were established
as public-private partnerships with government agencies,

sovereign wealth funds, and development finance institutions (DFIs) as major investors. More recently, foundations,
bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations have
also entered partnerships with agricultural investment
funds. The development partners are important because
they provide direction to focus investments on lowerincome, harder to access farmers and SMEs. They also provide a source of patient capital, and sometimes separate
grant funds for technical assistance, enabling fund investment managers to have greater flexibility in providing support to underserved clients.
Social impact investments are made “with the intention
to generate positive, measurable social and environmental
impact alongside a financial return.”73 Targeting a range of
returns from below market rate to market rate, social impact
investments are typically made to address challenges in sectors including agricultural development, renewable energy,
microfinance, housing, health care, and education services.
Social impact investing and enterprises represent a growing
trend among donor agencies, multilateral organizations,
and philanthropic funders to invest within the framework
of a business model to ensure sustainability of results on
the ground.
The Kenya certified potato seed program illustrates
how social impact investing can be used to support scaling
up of improved agricultural technology that has expected
high social benefits over the long term but is not a good
candidate for immediate commercial funding. Potato is
a key cash and subsistence crop for 2.5 million Kenyan
smallholders, but average yields of 7–8 tons per hectare
are low compared to the potential 30 tons/ha, mainly due
to the lack of quality disease-free seed of improved varieties. A long-term partnership between donors, the CGIAR’s
International Potato Center (CIP), SFSA, the Kenyan government, and the private sector made it possible to address
this need in a systems context.74
CIP, with funding from USAID and the German Agency
for International Cooperation (GIZ), developed a “3G”
approach and technologies that significantly reduced the
time and cost to produce certified, disease-free seed potatoes.75 The CIP 3G advance made it more attractive for the
private sector to expand potato seed production in Kenya.
SFSA subsequently assisted one of the original 3G private sector potato seed multipliers (Kisima Farm), beginning in 2011, to expand its production base from 10 to
100 hectares in 2018, with most potato seed sold locally
to smallholder farmers. Kisima Farm’s seed potato production now exceeds the total seed production output of the
Kenyan public sector. SFSA assistance included technical
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consulting for seed production and support for training
local potato growers. To complement the improved varieties available through CIP, SFSA also brokered a successful alliance with a Dutch private breeder (HZPC) to allow
Kisima to commercially produce seed of modern processing varieties in Kenya in return for a royalty payment. In
addition, SFSA co-funded a USD $1.1 million investment
by the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) to construct a 1,000-ton cold store and additional facilities with
Kisima Farm, which later self-funded a further doubling
of their cold store capacity. A survey of local smallholder
farmers credited the new and improved potato seed with
increasing yields up to tenfold.76 However, despite the successes of Kisima and four other similar potato seed businesses, their combined potato seed production capacity
still reaches only an estimated 10% of the local market.77
Babban Gona,78 which means “great farm” in Nigeria’s Hausa language, works through a network of franchise
farmer groups to provide services to large numbers of widely
dispersed smallholders. The program has disbursed 16,000
small, 2-year loans ($600/client on average). With a repayment rate of 99%, Babban Gona has been able to attract
commercial investors who do not ordinarily invest in the
agricultural sector. Franchise group members are provided
with the correct mix of agricultural inputs and application
services and, through their groups, can access good warehousing, commodity markets, and negotiated, fair prices.79
The organization has developed a blended capital
structure to raise funds by leveraging debt from domestic
and international social investors to de-risk and “crowd in”
low-cost commercial capital. By 2018, Babban Gona had
raised approximately $30 million in debt and equity, with
a further pipeline of $30 million anticipated.80
One Acre Fund (OAF) is a nonprofit social enterprise
that generates earned revenue to maintain its core programs
and solicits donor funding to support program expansion
and innovation across different countries. OAF began working with 120 smallholder farm families in western Kenya
in 2006, and by 2018 had expanded to serve 809,000 farm
families in six countries of Southern and Eastern Africa81
across Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania. Like Babban Gona, One Acre Fund has developed a
scalable model built around farmer groups and offers several
services. The program offers financing for agricultural inputs,
including hybrid seed and fertilizer, to farmer-organized
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groups that are jointly liable for loan repayment by harvest
time. These inputs are distributed for collection within walking distance of farmers’ homes. OAF also provides interactive, in-person training on topics throughout the season
such as fertilizer application, planting in rows, and other
agricultural methods. In addition, the program assists farmers in marketing their crops (in contrast to Babban Gona,
which buys commodities directly from farmers), including
training on safe storage so that farmers are able to wait to
sell in order to maximize their profits. OAF programs have
farmer loan repayment rates of 99%.82, 83
Babban Gona and One Acre Fund both appear to have
moved into Step 3 of the scaling framework (Figure 1.2),
but it is too soon to judge the eventual scale of either.
Both cases have raised some questions about whether their
access to larger amounts of capital at lower interest rates
and domination of local input and commodity markets
may discourage investments by more local private sector
competitors. The models are very promising, but much will
depend on the appetite of investors to sustain them over
the long term, and their longer-term impact on the shape
of rural market services.

Takeaways
Scaling pro-poor agricultural innovation will be possible
only if means can be found to scale the availability of
the finance needed to fuel such change. And that gap is
unlikely to be significantly diminished without reducing
the risk, perceived risk, or transaction costs associated with
investment in pro-poor agriculture. For now, the $200 billion of unfunded need remains a yawning chasm.
While we cite in this chapter some promising examples of potentially scalable financing mechanisms and an
increasing array of new financial innovations from which
to learn, the fact remains that virtually all of the finance
approaches—ranging from index insurance to social impact
investing partnerships—are relatively modest in size and at
an early stage in their application to pro-poor agriculture.
Testing, stretching, and adapting mechanisms such as those
noted in this chapter, so that they can meet the needs of
millions of farm and SME families, should occupy a central
place in the action and learning agendas of official donors,
governments, philanthropists, and scholars.

CHAPTER 5

Creating an Enabling Environment
for Scale—Partnerships, Policy,
Behavioral Change, and Institutions

As the scalability assessment tools highlighted in Chapter
2 make clear, many of the factors most central to scaling
are not under the direct control of project implementers or
donors. They are characteristics of the settings and arrangements within which these interventions occur. But that
doesn’t mean intervenors should accept these conditions
passively. Rather, it is a call to action for ways in which
intervenors can marshal the evidence and build the coalitions needed to make fundamental and lasting change.
The enabling environment for scaling includes factors that are internal to the implementer or funder (e.g.,
institutional incentives for scaling) or external (e.g., in the
ecosystem). Enabling conditions may include existing, positive “drivers” of the scaling process, and factors that currently present “barriers” to scaling but that, if altered, may
themselves become positive drivers. Among the enabling
environment components highlighted during the Purdue
conference were partnerships, policy, behavioral change,
and institutions.84

Partnerships
Partnerships are the beating heart of successful, sustainable
scaling efforts. Recognizing the different strengths, objectives, and ways of operating that various partners bring to
the table, and finding common ground, is fundamental.
Mutual trust, transparency, ongoing dialogue, and a willingness to adapt are important in building partnerships
among organizations with very different strengths.

Evidence from recent cases suggests that there is much
to be gained by critically rethinking the role of private sector partners and the role of donors in facilitating effective
and sustainable partnerships. An illustrative example is the
Cereal Systems Initiative for South Asia—Mechanization
and Irrigation (CSISA-MI) project in Bangladesh, codesigned by CIMMYT, an international research organization, and iDE, an organization specializing in commercial
market development.
The project goal was to expand the use of small mechanized seeders, reapers, and high-volume irrigation pumps
by smallholder families to alleviate a severe labor constraint. CIMMYT knew what technologies were needed,
and where, to improve smallholder productivity and efficiency; and iDE brought its expertise in business and market development, enabling it to source machinery from
agro-industry and develop networks of micro-entrepreneurs to bring the machinery and services close to farmers. Critical to this partnership and successful scaling effort
were the commitment to using a market approach and
adapting the project in response to market feedback. This
included CIMMYT’s willingness to pivot on which crops,
machines, farmers, and locations to target, despite its organizational commitment to supporting wheat, maize, and
cereals.85
Intermediary organizations (see Chapter 7) can play a
key role in facilitating strategic partnerships for scaling—
a role that is usually underrecognized and underfunded.
Financial organizations—NGOs and for-profits—are
increasingly playing this role in low-income countries.

17

For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, Root Capital mobilized the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to
co-design the Coffee Farmer Resilience Initiative (CFRI),
illustrating how blended finance and social impact investment can help bring together partners with different
motivations to solve a complex financing and technical
assistance problem. In CFRI, the objectives of the involved
public sector institutions were to improve incomes and
food security while addressing systemic issues, including conflict, migration, and deforestation. Private sector
partners needed a reliable supply of high-quality coffee
and, for purposes of corporate social responsibility, also
wanted to advance economic development and environmental sustainability in the communities where they
worked. Philanthropic partners sought to develop new
cross-sector models where their funding could be used to
unlock additional resources from other private and public
sector partners.86
CFRI also illustrates the practical difficulties of implementing a partnership, and the key role of intermediaries
in pulling together all the pieces. Both USAID and IDB-MIF
wanted to partner with global coffee buyers to ensure the
sustainability of the program, but the private sector had to
co-invest so that public monies would not directly subsidize private supply chains, and public monies had to be
used where development needs were greatest. While private companies wanted to support activities in their own
supply chains, they were reluctant to pool funds to address
an industry-wide problem. As intermediaries, Root Capital
and CFRI were able to direct corporate investments to their
specific supply chains and use grant funding to address
needs in underserved areas.87
Partnership selection should be part of a stepwise
approach of characterizing innovations, diagnosing their
readiness to scale, developing strategies to overcome scaling bottlenecks, and subsequently agreeing on which partners and partnership process can effectively address the
bottlenecks.88
A key premise for partner selection should be a shared
vision of delivery at scale and of the partners best equipped
to overcome specific scaling bottlenecks. This is in stark
contrast to the common practice of defaulting to the most
familiar partners regardless of the scaling context. It is
likely, for example, that partners for doing field demonstrations (e.g., a national NGO) will be very different from
partners that can provide access to finance at scale (e.g.,
commercial banks).89 Likewise, it is likely that the best partners for long-term delivery may be unaccustomed to working on short-term donor-funded projects.
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Policy Environment
In his remarks to the Purdue Scale Up Conference, Akin
Adesina cast policy as one side of a “scaling up triangle”—
science and technology, political will, and policy and incentives.90 The government plays an essential role in regulating
access to core factors of production, including land, and in
providing services such as seed certification and trade regulation. Policies and programs, including smart subsidies,
can play a major role in driving scaling and creating an
enabling environment for scaling agricultural innovations;
but any subsidies, if not well targeted, can also create significant distortions. Ensuring that proposed interventions are
aligned with government priorities, and early outreach to
build relationships with public sector agriculture officials,
increase the prospects for helpful synergies and openings
for discussions about how to address policy constraints.
Also speaking at the Purdue conference, David Spielman91 of the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) suggested that those interested in addressing policy
shortfalls and scaling innovation need to become policy
“makers” rather than policy “takers” by seeking to influence
the influencers. He noted the need to go beyond evidence
and data analysis, which by themselves do not actually
change policy. Spielman called for an increased focus on
evidence-based advocacy and communication to accelerate
policy changes that matter for scaling innovations.
As the scaling framework presented in Chapter 1 suggests, third parties can play a role in facilitating and supporting policy change. Key functions involve developing
and socializing solid evidence, identifying and supporting
champions of change, building the capacity of key agencies, and providing bridge funding for the transition from
one policy regime to another. Projects can be used to highlight policy constraints that limit scaling and to build the
evidence supporting change; but they can also be used to
help build the constituencies, coalitions, and strategies for
advancing that change.
One example of proactive work to support policy
change comes from Rwanda, where HarvestPlus began to
engage high-level government officials prior to the release
of biofortified iron-rich bean varieties. This early outreach
helped to integrate the production and consumption of
biofortified crops into national policies. The National
Food and Nutrition Policy highlights biofortified crops as
a strategy to improve nutrition in the country, and the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda
recognizes consumption of legumes, such as iron beans,
as critical for improved nutrition. HarvestPlus established

a close relationship with the Rwanda Agriculture Board,
which helped to quickly scale up biofortified bean production; and linkages created with the Ministry of Health,
through participation in the joint nutrition taskforce, built
stronger nutrition messaging, including the promotion of
iron bean varieties by community health clinics.92
Government policies and program interventions can
significantly affect both demand and supply factors that
have a direct bearing on the spread of innovations. Senegal,
heavily reliant on imported Asian rice for its main staple
food, was severely affected by the 2007/2008 global food
price crisis. The price of rice rose by more than 100%.93
Subsequently, the government of Senegal introduced a
policy of rice self-sufficiency and a comprehensive package
of subsidies to support irrigated rice sector development.
These incentives included setting prices paid to farmers
well above their production costs, making direct purchases
of rice, improving irrigation and road infrastructure, and
subsidizing inputs, credit, insurance, and purchases of
machinery. Rice importers were also required to purchase
amounts of domestic rice in direct proportion to their
imports, guaranteeing a market for domestic rice.
The use of public subsidies to promote agricultural
development in low-income countries has been debated
numerous times over the years, but, as Akin Adesina and
other participants at the Purdue conference pointed out,
the United States and the European Union both heavily
subsidize their agricultural sectors, and without subsidies
India would not have achieved the Green Revolution. Subsidies can be misused, but the challenge, Adesina said, is to
target these subsidies more effectively and to create better
and more transparent ways of delivering them.
The heavy government intervention in the case of Senegal appears to have helped “crowd in” private sector investment by significantly reducing risks. Overall, the package
of policies and programs greatly facilitated the adoption
of irrigated rice innovations promoted by the USAIDfunded Projet Croissance Economique (PCE), even as they
clearly distorted parts of the value chain, especially for
wholesalers and retailers.94 A recent cost-benefit analysis
found that PCE, government, and other donor programs
significantly improved the productivity of the irrigated rice
value chain since 2012. Even accounting for government
subsidies and donor support, economic benefits outweigh
the costs. However, the analysis raises concerns about
long-term sustainability. The economic rate of return was
found to be only marginally above the discount rate, indicating the importance of an exit strategy for government
and donor programs, while also noting that the removal

of subsidies “could result in adverse effects throughout
the value chain.”95 Rice is an internationally traded good.
There are questions about whether Senegal, particularly
its smallholders, will be able to successfully compete with
lower-cost international competitors (many of whom
themselves benefit from government subsidy programs)
over the longer term, even with improved technologies and
preferred access to the domestic market.
Similarly, the Nigerian government has long sought to
expand the cultivation of cassava to boost its domestic agriculture sector, improve smallholder incomes, and reduce
the country’s reliance on imported wheat and rice. Cassava
spoils easily and must be gathered and quickly processed
after harvest. Over the years, the Nigerian government has
introduced a range of policies and programs to boost production and demand for cassava products, including tariffs
on wheat importation and requiring bakers to incorporate
a percentage of high-quality cassava flour into their goods.96
These and other incentives to further develop the value
chain have facilitated the widespread adoption of highyielding cassava varieties and the expansion of production
from about 12 million metric tons in the late 1980s to over
50 million metric tons in 2011.97
Transferring the delivery of subsidies from the public sector to the private sector, and adding technology, is
helping to improve efficiency and deter corruption. In
Nigeria, nearly $5 billion in fertilizer subsidies intended
to support greater agricultural productivity are estimated
to have been diverted through corruption.98 Some states
have responded by removing the public sector from direct
procurement and distribution of fertilizer, and by developing systems that allow farmers to use mobile phones and
smart vouchers to buy fertilizer directly from local private
agro-dealers.
Government agencies also provide essential regulatory and oversight services for scalable innovations. It is
important for scaling partners to understand the process
and get an early start on addressing requirements. Kenya
has a highly regarded plant health safety inspection system,
for example, but it can still take several years to register
new seed varieties, even when those varieties are already
available in neighboring countries. Some countries, including Zambia, are now allowing private sector companies
to undertake inspection services to speed up the process,
shifting the state’s role from direct service provision to
oversight.99
An important scaling consideration is whether new
innovations will have access to regional markets. In subSaharan Africa, regional economic communities (ECOWAS,
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COMESA, EAC, SADC) have developed frameworks for
harmonizing seed variety release, registration, certification,
and sanitary and phytosanitary review, but implementing
the frameworks will require changes at the national level—
legislation or regulation—in order to take effect.100
Data and technology are increasingly being used to
improve the efficiency of systems that were formerly dominated by the public sector. For example, as discussed in
Chapter 4, index-based insurance has created new interest
and markets for agricultural insurance. The use of data and
advanced modeling has effectively removed the need for
the cumbersome, expensive, and corruption-prone process
of assessing risks and claims on an individual basis. Other
new tools, including test kits, scratch cards with lot numbers, and telephone help lines, allow consumers to easily
verify online whether purchased fertilizer and seed are
legitimate and unexpired.
An alliance of public and private organizations, the
SeedAssure Alliance, has facilitated the development of a
new digital technology platform to unblock multiple challenges in African seed systems. SeedAssure101 will enable
real-time data collection and secure data sharing across
multiple seed value chain stakeholders for both quality assurance and regulatory purposes. The platform will
operationalize harmonized seed regulation protocols and,
when fully launched in 2019, is anticipated to expedite
quality production, commercialization, and trade of seed
for major crops in eastern and southern Africa.102

Behavior Change
When asked to identify the scale up driver or enabling condition they felt was most often neglected to the detriment
of the scale up effort, a majority of participants at the Purdue conference pointed to behavior change. In reflecting
on effective media strategies for behavior change and the
challenges faced by many current strategies for encouraging behavior change in pro-poor agriculture, Bill Ryerson, founder of the Population Media Center (PMC),103
reminded conference participants that people rarely change
their behavior because of information alone.
Research shows that most behavioral decisions are
heavily influenced by emotional considerations and cultural norms. Finding creative ways to engage with the audience and affect what looks like the norm, therefore, can
be a useful strategy to produce change. The infotainment
radio and TV programs developed by PMC, for example,
focus on constructing role model characters with whom
20
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listeners can identify. During its long-running, multi-issue,
compelling programs, various characters are developed,
presented with options, and make choices. To ensure the
sociocultural relevance of content, all programs are created by local writers. Because radio programming is widely
accessible in low-income countries, these programs reach
scale immediately. In northern Nigeria, PMC programs on
family planning reached up to 72% of the whole population; and 67% of reproductive health clients in Nigeria
cited the PMC program as the motivation for their visit.104
Kuza Biashara105 is premised on the importance of starting a conversation with the “client” wherever he or she is,
providing information that is relevant to their needs, in a
format that is accessible to them. This Kenya-based digital
micro-learning and community platform offers people in
the informal sector access to a library of structured, micromodule learning that can be accessed by users on demand.
The models deal with practical, sector-specific skills (from
smallholder agriculture to masons to bakers), interpersonal
skills, and business management training.
Other programs that are more focused on agriculture
and tap into similar ideas about context and role models
are also emerging. Shamba Shape-Up,106 a television show
aired in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania since 2012, features
co-hosts and a farm-based “makeover reality show” format that engages participants. Funded through contributions from development agencies, foundations, and private
companies, the content of the show is provided by national
and international research centers. For example, CIMMYT
partnered with Shamba Shape-Up to produce an episode
on conservation agriculture.107 Staff interact with viewers
to find out what topics are of most interest to them. The
show’s website has now expanded to include a tool to submit questions offline to be answered by an expert, and an
agricultural budgeting tool.
Digital Green,108 an NGO working in India, Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Afghanistan, trains farmers to make and show
short videos in which they discuss their problems, share
solutions, and highlight success stories. It is a technologyenabled means of behavior change communication built
around local communities and role models. Researchers, development practitioners, and rural villagers come
together to produce and share locally relevant information
through videos in which the villagers are the “stars.”
Market forces are, of course, a very powerful force for
behavior change affecting both consumers and producers. Rising incomes and urbanization are driving consumers across the globe to demand more meat, poultry, fish,
fruit and vegetables, and more processed products. This is

beginning to change farming systems, creating opportunities for different models of farming such as peri-urban
farming and protected cultivation, and increasing opportunities for SMEs offering such things as artisanal processing and food service. Consumer demands are also affecting
agricultural systems in other ways. Heightened awareness
of sustainability and concerns for the livelihoods of smallholder communities by consumers are driving new partnerships such as the one between Corteva and CIMMYT
in Mexico to train farmers and improve sustainable agriculture practices, in collaboration with companies such as
Nestle, Kellogg, and Walmart that are increasingly interested in responsibly sourced products.109

Institutions
A recurring theme of discussions at the Purdue Scale Up Conference is the worry that the internal institutional incentives
of most funding agencies and implementing organizations
are not aligned to support the fundamental changes thought
to be critical to the scaling process (see Chapter 7). For
example, flexibility in implementation, including in redesigning the approach at stages to reflect learning and accommodate changing partnerships, is not typically supported by
the prevailing project design and contracting process, which

currently allows little flexibility for midcourse changes.
Prevailing practice facilitates “partnerships of funding convenience” in which “partnered” organizations continue to
operate largely in siloes.110 It does not facilitate the creation
of working, strategic, and opportunistic partnerships within
individual programs or between related sets of programs
that are not contractually connected to one another from the
program start. The result is separate programs that address
agricultural productivity, improved nutrition, strengthening
value chains, and improving policy in siloed fashion. There
is no “meta-level” guidance or “system leader” to steer so
that the yield of the components is something more than a
summing of individual efforts.
There is no single formula or easy path to creating the
enabling environment needed for successful scaling. But
every intervention that aspires to scale needs to pay intense
attention to the partnership, policy, behavioral, and institutional factors on which such scaling will depend. To say
that these factors are beyond the direct control of innovators does not in any way reduce their centrality or, as
several examples in this chapter bear witness, mean that
creative approaches and partnerships cannot be devised to
influence these factors and overcome barriers. This has farreaching implications for the strategy, design, monitoring,
and exit conditions of more technically conceived interventions aspiring to reach large populations.
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CHAPTER 6

Tailoring Metrics, Monitoring,
and Evaluation to Support
Sustainable Outcomes at Scale

As noted in Chapter 2, relatively few research or pilot projects generate the critical information needed to go beyond
proof of concept and provide a basis for assessing scalability, streamlining delivery, informing advocacy, and guiding
scaling.111 Increasingly, however, scaling experience demonstrates that the following three overlapping but different
types or tiers of information are needed (Figure 6.1).112
Tier 1 information is generated to test the efficacy of
interventions, often under controlled or semicontrolled
conditions.
Tier 2 information is used to refine, simplify, and adapt
interventions to real-life policy, financial, and operational
considerations.

Figure 6.1. Information Needs for Scaling—a Three-Tier Approach

22

Tier 3 information is generated during the scaling process to monitor fidelity and inform needed adjustments to
intervention design and scaling strategy during the scaling
process.
It is tempting to view these tiers as a sequence of information needs over time as the focus of scaling moves from
effectiveness to efficiency to expansion. However, experience
suggests the need to incorporate efficiency and expansion
considerations, and to test results under realistic conditions, at the earliest possible time rather than to defer these
issues until proof of concept is well established. To do otherwise is to run serious risk of adding to the graveyard of
“proven” but unscalable technologies.

Figure 6.2. The Winding Pathway to Scale

It is also important to note that detailed planning is
no substitute for rapid learning, and for the willingness
and flexibility to make changes in response to that learning. With a few notable exceptions, interventions that
scale successfully take 15 or more years to achieve sustainable national scale; and, during that period, they make
numerous adjustments to accommodate realities that were
unforeseeable at the outset (Figure 6.2).113
As agricultural interventions scale, one good practice is
to institutionalize “pause and reflect” sessions at least twice
a year. Increasingly, however, it is becoming clear that this
is not enough. The most effective scaling strategies now
use information technology to drive a variety of real-time
monitoring tools intended to support frequent changes.
One Acre Fund, PCE in Senegal, and Babban Gona in Nigeria are three instructive examples of the use of real-time
information to drive implementation and guide scaling. It
is also important that information systems—particularly
Tier 3 information systems—incorporate and support the
information needs of the private sector and the host government at the earliest possible time.114
By definition, scaling places a premium on effects
and impact beyond a project’s direct reach and duration.
As such, the focus of monitoring and evaluation necessarily includes—and should prioritize—indirect rather than
direct beneficiaries, and contribution (or “plausible association”) rather than strict attribution. These realities have
direct implications for metrics, monitoring, and evaluation, including:
• It is counterproductive to focus performance
indicators exclusively on the direct effects of donor
expenditures.
• For technologies that are bundled with good
agricultural practices, “adoption” is not a binary
variable; and packages of innovations are often

adopted incrementally, partially, or on only a percentage of a farmer’s land.
• Evidence of efficacy under controlled conditions
needs to be complemented by careful analysis of
scaling under real-life conditions and constraints.
• More useful are metrics such as “repeated use,”
“willingness to pay,” “willingness to recommend to
a friend or relative,” “competition among suppliers and aggregators”—metrics familiar to growing
businesses.
Two informative cases of the effective use of data to
support long-term scaling efforts are the ongoing work of
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to promote the development and use of high-yielding varieties
in Africa;115 and the work of International Development
Enterprises—Bangladesh (iDE-B) and CIMMYT to promote the commercial leasing and use of two-wheel tractors, threshers, and low-lift irrigation pumps.116 These cases
also underline the point made by several observers that it
is possible to better integrate project metrics and M&E systems with the data on sales and marketing, distribution,
transaction costs, and profitability generated by and useful
for commercial partners.
One useful compilation of M&E tools for scaling propoor agricultural interventions comes from a surprising
source—the health sector.117 Particularly useful are the
range of tools suggested for Tier 2 and Tier 3 monitoring,
evaluation, and learning. Tools such as these make it a possible to track over time the variables and challenges prioritized during scalability assessments in ways that meet the
information needs of famers, agribusinesses, and policy
makers.
A methodology called Real-Time Scaling Labs, originally developed and applied by the Brookings Institution
in a program called Millions Learning in the education sector, offers considerable potential for improving knowledge
about agricultural scaling.118 The approach embeds teams
within selected interventions, equipped with clear protocols and a multi-stakeholder participatory process. The
teams develop and monitor scaling plans in ways designed
to serve, simultaneously, three objectives: (1) organized
learning; (2) strategic reflection and review; and (3) documentation (Figure 6.3). Recent developments in information technology, particularly cellphones and remote
sensing, hold particular promise for making such realtime or quick-loop learning a practical reality even in lowresource settings.
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Figure 6.3. Real-Time Scaling Labs

Finally, it is important to note that, even with the best
planning and the most diligent management, relatively
few innovations will—or should—be scaled. The human
and material costs of change, the potential downside risks
for adopters, and the inevitability of unpleasant surprises
along the way mean that the bar should be set high. That
applies to the viability of the business model as well as the
efficacy of the innovation. Although the current success
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rate of scaling—estimated at less than 5%—is unacceptably
low, reported “success” rates in excess of those common
in the private sector should likewise be cause for concern.
Given the intensity of donor and market pressures for rapid
results, compounded by the normal human impulse of
implementers to fall in love with their interventions, the
role of effective monitoring and evaluation should often be
to say “no,” or at least “not yet,” or “not here.”

CHAPTER 7

The Critical Role of Intermediary
and Donor Organizations

Few interventions or innovations transition successfully to
scale without someone performing a variety of “intermediation” functions, including investment packaging and
policy advocacy. In the commercialization of high-margin
innovations, these functions are often performed by highly
compensated investment bankers, venture capitalists, and
strategic consultants.119
By contrast, in the low-margin, high-risk world of propoor agriculture, these semi-invisible functions, which fall
between the more easily recognized functions of innovation and service delivery, have few reliable funding sources
or advocates. Lacking the glamor of innovation, the immediacy of direct service delivery, or the prospect of charging
and recovering significant transactional returns, funding for
these intermediation functions—with a few notable exceptions—becomes a missing link in the value chain or a missing gear in the scaling “machine” (Figure 7.1).
The term “intermediation” as used here refers to functions such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

different forms during each of these steps. During Step 1—
the planning step—key intermediation functions include
strategic planning, impact evaluation, and operations
research. During Step 2—the commitment step—the focus
of intermediation shifts to convening and coordinating
stakeholders, fundraising, investment packaging, advocacy,
and marketing. And during Step 3—the operational step—
the emphasis is on change management, organizational
development, and systems strengthening.
There is a key difference between fully commercial
consumer goods and pro-poor agricultural innovation
that makes intermediation functions even more important in the latter case. For pro-poor agricultural interventions, decisions by governments and third-party funders
often stand between supply and demand. Reconciling the
different incentives and operating styles of governments,
investors, donors, and farmers means that intermediary
organizations have a particularly important role to play in
bridging these divides.

Strategic Planning
Impact Evaluation and Operations Research
Fundraising
Investment Packaging and Placement
Advocacy and Marketing
Convening and Coordinating Stakeholders
Change Management

As presented in Chapter 1, scaling up can be seen as
a three-step process. The first step focuses on planning for
scale, the second step focuses on galvanizing necessary
support, and the third step focuses on carrying out a disciplined change management process. Intermediation takes

Figure 7.1. The Critical Role and Functions of Intermediary
Organizations
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In these settings, intermediary organizations often find
themselves unable to pass the cost of their operations on to
either the organization doing the innovating or the organization that potentially delivers the service at scale. There is,
for this reason, a compelling case for more donor support
for these intermediary functions and for the organizations
that carry them out.
Equally profound are the changes needed in the internal procedures and incentives of donor organizations in
order to institutionalize a focus on scale and scaling. The
challenge in this case is to reimagine projects as ways to
catalyze, de-risk, or otherwise advance systemic change by
governments and businesses. That requires major changes
in strategy, metrics, procedures, and incentives to move the
scaling agenda from the periphery into the mainstream of
organizational operations.
Fortunately, there are a growing number of successful
reform efforts from which to learn. Some donors are setting

up new entities with an explicit mandate that includes scaling (e.g., Grand Challenges Canada); others are establishing specialized units to foster innovation and/or support
scaling (e.g., USAID’s Global Development Lab); several
donor strategies incorporate or prioritize support for intermediary organizations (e.g., the Ford Foundation); and a
few donors have begun to institute top-to-bottom efforts
to mainstream scaling as a central feature of organizational
operations.
Among the most extensive and instructive efforts to
mainstream scaling within a donor organization has been
undertaken by IFAD (Box 7.1), beginning in 2009 with an
institutional review of its approach120 and later an analysis of its experience in 2013.121 Studies carried out by the
Brookings Institution informed that effort, and the candid
evaluation of progress several years later (2017122) offers
useful touchpoints for other donors considering such
efforts.

Box 7.1 IFAD’s Efforts to Institutionalize a Focus on Scale
An evaluation by IFAD’s Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) and an assessment by a technical team from the
Brookings Institution,123 both published in 2010, concluded that while IFAD had supported successful scaling
efforts in particular countries and projects, the fund needed to develop a systematic approach to scaling. The
Brookings team provided IFAD with specific recommendations on how to mainstream the scaling up agenda
into its operational policies and practices, its staffing and financial resource management, its monitoring and
evaluation, and its knowledge management.124
Between 2012 and 2018 IFAD management committed to the scaling up agenda in its action agendas for
three successive Replenishment Consultations (IFAD9, IFAD10, and IFAD11). To help mainstream scaling up into
its operations, IFAD prepared in 2015 an “Operational Framework for Scaling Up Results” as a guide for its operational staff. It also developed various knowledge products (including country and thematic scaling up notes), a
staff training program, and a website for its scaling up documentation. Since 2015, IFAD has participated actively
in the global Scaling Up Community of Practice and has led the Working Group on Scaling Up in Agriculture and
Rural Development.
An evaluation of IFAD’s efforts on scaling up carried out by IOE in 2017 noted that, despite considerable
progress, “scaling up remains a work in progress,” emphasizing the need to ensure that frontline staff are fully
engaged in implementing the scaling agenda and that the agenda is shared by IFAD’s partners in the countries
of its operations.125

There are also a growing number of foundations and
NGOs incorporating scaling as a central feature of their
mission, mandate, and operating modalities. Noteworthy
examples include Catholic Relief Services, which is basing its new strategy on scaling outcomes related to six key
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interventions; the MacArthur Foundation’s 100&Change
competition, which awards a single $100 million grant
to scale a solution to a major problem; collective philanthropy efforts by Co-Impact and the Audacious Project;
and the Eleanor Crook Foundation’s full integration of

scaling and sustainability considerations into its grant
procedures.126
The implications of adopting a scaling perspective are
no less profound for research institutions. In that regard,
there are many insights to be gleaned from GIZ’s support
for a task force of full-time scaling experts that help integrate scaling considerations and a “scaling scan” into the

CGIAR system127 and from IITA’s efforts to incorporate a
systematic approach to assessing and enhancing “scaling
readiness.”
Some of the specific implications of scaling for value
chain organizations concerned with production, financing, marketing, and regulation are explored in Chapters
3, 4, and 5.

The Critical Role of Intermediary and Donor Organizations  |
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CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

It is time to deepen the discourse, extend the audience, and
enhance the tools available for (1) designing with scale in
mind, (2) assessing scalability, and (3) managing the transition to platforms capable of, and incentivized to, deliver at
scale. To that end, we conclude with eight insights informed
by the Purdue conference, side sessions at the 2018 World
Food Prize, and discussions within the Agriculture and
Rural Development Working Group of the Global Community of Practice on Scaling Development Outcomes:
• Delivery at scale is not a gigantic project or a series
of projects. We need to plan for millions, not thousands; for uncontrolled, not controlled, settings;
for generations, not for five years; and for addressing, not working around, political and market
realities.
• This requires narrowing the gap between macro
goals and micro interventions, by linking the
language and logic of projects to the language and
logic of development effectiveness.
• Development assistance can help, but it will not
solve the problem. Only markets and governments can; and commercial markets should
normally be the default setting. Short-term interventions (“projects”) and subsidies can make big
and positive differences, especially in reaching
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•

•
•

•

•

underserved smallholders and SMEs, but only if
used strategically. They can also introduce major
distortions.
It is essential to view agriculture as a business,
not a social sector; to treat farmers as businesses
and customers, not as beneficiaries; and to focus
more attention on the full value chain, on finance,
on incentives, on the intermediation needed to
bring innovation to scale, and on the enabling
environment.
New partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives
are essential for tackling scaling challenges.
Initiatives must go beyond being “policy takers”
and play a much more proactive role in facilitating
policy change that can be a scaling force multiplier.
There is rarely a straight line or a short journey
from research and innovation to validation and
rollout. Adaptive management is an essential ingredient in all successful scaling efforts.
The actions of research institutions, NGOs, and
other implementing partners are shaped by donor
policies, metrics, and procedures. Systemic change,
therefore, needs to give special attention to
changes in the funding priorities, internal incentives, and operational procedures of those donor
institutions.

CHAPTER 9

An Invitation to Continue the Conversation

The September 2018 conference at Purdue University (Figure 9.1), which inspired this Sourcebook, built on work taking place under the auspices of a Global Community of
Practice on Scaling Development Outcomes (CoP). The
CoP was launched in February 2015 to:
• Serve as a champion for “scaling up” as a priority
concern within the development community,

• Develop and disseminate an effective framework
for scaling,
• Establish a peer network for sharing operational
approaches, experience, and lessons,
• Contribute to thought leadership and case examples on scaling, and
• Provide advice and networking on how to access
resources and talent.

Figure 9.1. Participants at Scale Up Conference held at Purdue University, September 25–27, 2018. Photo credit: Tim Thompson,
Agricultural Communication, Purdue University
29

The CoP includes representatives from 250 donor,
research, and implementing organizations. Its members
come from a wide variety of sectors and backgrounds, drawn
together by a common commitment to advancing and professionalizing the scaling of development interventions.
The CoP is member-run, member-supported, and free
of charge, and includes working groups on:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Agriculture and Rural Development
Education
Health
Monitoring and Evaluation
Scaling in Fragile States
Youth Employment (planned for 2019)
Social Enterprise (planned for 2019)

The CoP and its Working Group on Agriculture and
Rural Development have agreed to host the materials from
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the Purdue conference and to serve as a forum for deepening the discussions begun there.
Interested readers are encouraged to reach out directly
to the organizations cited in this Sourcebook or through the
CoP with their ideas for building on and enhancing the
efforts, tools, and approaches presented here; to experiment with the tools cited here and with their own; and to
document and contribute their thoughts, approaches, and
experience to our collective understanding on how to scale
pro-poor agricultural solutions most effectively.
Those interested in joining the CoP can contact
its curators, Larry Cooley (lcooley@msi-inc.com) or
Johannes Linn (jlinn@brookings.edu). Enquiries about
the CoP’s Working Group on Agriculture and Rural Development should be directed to Maria Elena Mangiafico
(m.mangiafico@ifad.org).

N OT E S

1. Steve Radelet, Georgetown University, private correspondence with the author, June 4, 2018.
2. Authors’ estimate based on firsthand experience and extensive anecdotal evidence.
3. MSI, Scaling Up—From Vision to Large-Scale Change, 3rd ed.
(MSI, 2016), https://msiworldwide.com/additional
-resources/msi-scaling-framework; Seerp Wigboldus et al.,
“Systemic perspectives on scaling agricultural innovations,”
Agronomy for Sustainable Development 36, no. 3 (2016): 46,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13593-016-0380-z.
4. Arntraud Hartmann and Johannes Linn, “Scaling Up: A
Framework and Lessons for Development Effectiveness
from Literature and Practice” (Wolfensohn Center for
Development Working Paper 5, Brookings Institution,
October 2008).
5. MSI, Scaling Up.
6. Richard Kohl and Colm Foy, Guide to the Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool for Assessing and Improving the Scaling
of Agricultural Technologies (USAID, 2018), https://pdf.usaid
.gov/pdf_docs/PA00T6KX.pdf.
7. “Session 1 Planning with Scale in Mind” (video), Purdue
University, September 26, 2018, https://docs.lib.purdue
.edu/scaleup/planning/speakerpanel/1.
8. The One Acre Fund, the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture’s work to improve the quality of potato
seed in Kenya, and Babban Gona’s use of a franchise
model to promote commercial farming in Nigeria are
three examples of innovations that paid early attention to
commercialization and unit cost. For videos describing the
Babban Gona and Syngenta Foundation case studies, see
Babban Gona, “Babban Gona Wins Prestigious Skoll Award
for Social Entrepreneurship” (video), 2017, https://docs.lib.
purdue.edu/scaleup/opening/videos/1/; Syngenta Foundation, “Scaling Potato Seed Production in East Africa”
(video), 2018, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup
/opening/videos/2/.
9. Authors’ estimate.
10. MSI, Scaling Up; Seerp Wigboldes and Jan Brouwers, Using
a Theory of Scaling to Guide Decision Making (Wageningen
University & Research, 2016), http://www.theoryofchange
.nl/resource/using-theory-scaling-guide-decision-making.
11. MSI, Guidelines Planning for and Assessing Scalability (MSI,
2018), https://msiworldwide.com/sites/default/files/2019
-03/GUIDELINES.pdf.

12. Larry Cooley, “Innovating Is the Easy Part” (blog post),
Center for Education Innovations, Results for Development
Institute, April 20, 2016, https://educationinnovations.org
/blog/innovating-easy-part.
13. Gregory Gangelhoff and Sally Rey, “Delivering More Bang
for Development Bucks: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Feed the
Future” (blog post), USAID, December 15, 2014, https://
blog.usaid.gov/2014/12/delivering-more-bang-for
-development-bucks-cost-benefit-analysis-and-feed-the
-future/; “Cost-Benefit Analysis” (infographic), Office of
Economic Policy, USAID, accessed February 20, 2019,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865
/CBA_Map.pdf.
14. MSI, Scalability Checklist (MSI, 2016), https://msiworldwide
.com/sites/default/files/2019-02/MSI%20Scalability%20
Checklist.pdf; MSI, Scaling Up.
15. Kohl and Foy, “Agricultural Scalability Assessment Toolkit.”
16. For the foundation research supporting the ASAT tool and
guidelines for using the tool, see Kohl and Foy, Guide to the
Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool.
17. Conference Program: Supplemental Materials—Scalability
Assessment Tools and Frameworks (Purdue University, September 2018), https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup
/assessing/tools/1/; Kohl and Foy, Guide to the Agricultural
Scalability Assessment Tool, 49.
18. F. Jacobs, J. Ubels, and L. Woltering, The Scaling Scan: A
Practical Tool to Determine the Strengths and Weaknesses of
Your Scaling Ambition (PPPLab and CIMMYT, 2018), https://
www.cimmyt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PPPLab
-Scaling-Final-25-09.pdf.
19. “Technology Readiness Level,” NASA, updated October 28,
2012, https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan
/engineering/technology/txt_accordion1.html.
20. [Marc Schut and Murat Sartas], Scaling Readiness: Assessing and Accelerating Scaling of Innovations (CIGAR, January
2019), www.scalingreadiness.org.
21. John Gargani and Robert McLean, Scaling Impact: Innovation for the Public Good (forthcoming); Ann Mei Chang, Lean
Impact: How to Innovate for Radically Greater Social Good (John
Wiley & Sons, 2018); Lennart Woltering et al., “Scaling—
From ‘Reaching Many’ to Sustainable System Change: A
Critical Shift in Mindset,” Agricultural Systems (forthcoming).

31

22. IFAD, IFAD’s Operational Framework for Scaling Up Results
(IFAD, 2015), https://www.ifad.org/en/document-detail
/asset/39563355.
23. IDIA, Insights on Scaling Innovation (IDIA, 2017), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5b156e3bf2e6b10bb
0788609/t/5b1717eb8a922da5042cd0bc/1528240110897
/Insights+on+Scaling+Innovation.pdf; IDIA, Good Practice
Guides for Funders: Scaling Innovation (IDIA, 2017), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5b156e3bf2e6b10bb
0788609/t/5b17185af950b797a96de027/1528240221838
/Scaling+Innovation+Good+Practice+Guide.pdf.
24. Gray and Kohl, Scaling Up of Drought-Tolerant Maize in
Zambia; Kohl, Scaling Up of Sahel Rice Varieties in Senegal;
Kohl, Scaling Up of Agricultural Machinery in Bangladesh; Foy
and Wafula, Scaling Up of Hermetic Bag Technology (PICS) in
Kenya; Foy, Scaling Up of Improved Poultry Breeds in Uganda.
25. The ASAT tool commissioned by USAID and developed
by Management Systems International (MSI) was used to
assess the scalability of five USAID-supported innovations—
Improved Bean Varieties, Rift Valley Fever Vaccine, Directly
Sown Rice, Wetting Front Detector, and Heat Stress Tolerant
Maize. Each of these applications resulted in a stand-alone
report assessing the scalability of the innovation based on
37 scalability considerations related to characteristics of the
innovation, the market, and the country context.
26. For the scaling readiness cases, see Scaling Readiness Newsletter Series #3: The Scaling Readiness Case Studies, (CIGAR,
2017), https://tinyurl.com/scalingreadinesscases.
27. Conference Program: Scale Up Conference—Innovations in
Agriculture: Scaling Up to Reach Millions (Purdue University,
September 2018), https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup
/scaleup_program.pdf.
28. George Gray and Richard Kohl, Scaling Up of Drought-
Tolerant Maize in Zambia: Review of Successful Scaling of Agri
cultural Technologies (USAID, 2016), https://agrilinks
.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/BFS%20Scaling%20
Review%20-%20Zambia%20Report%20REVISED%202-8
-16.pdf; Richard Kohl, Scaling Up of Sahel Rice Varieties in
Senegal: Review of Successful Scaling of Agricultural Tech
nologies (USAID, 2016), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs
/PA00MDRC.pdf; Richard Kohl, Scaling Up of Agricultural
Machinery in Bangladesh: Review of Successful Scaling of
Agricultural Technologies (USAID, 2016), https://pdf.usaid
.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MC52.pdf; Colm Foy and Martin
Wafula, Scaling Up of Hermetic Bag Technology (PICS) in
Kenya: Review of Successful Scaling of Agricultural Technologies
(USAID, 2016), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MDZD
.pdf; Colm Foy, Scaling Up of Improved Poultry Breeds in
Uganda: Review of Successful Scaling of Agricultural Technologies (USAID, 2017), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs
/PA00MK5G.pdf.
29. MSI, Synthesis Report: Review of Successful Scaling of Agricultural Technologies (USAID, 2017), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf
_docs/PA00MMWJ.pdf; MSI, Briefing Note: Using Commercial Pathways to Scale Up Agricultural Technologies (USAID,
2017), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MXVS.pdf;

32

|

NOTES

30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.

36.

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

MSI, Workshop Report: Bureau for Food Security’s Scaling Agricultural Innovations Workshop (USAID, 2016), https://pdf
.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MB2R.pdf.
Richard Kohl and Colm Foy, “Agricultural Scalability
Assessment Toolkit” (Excel file) (USAID, 2018), https://dec
.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail_Presto.aspx?vID=47&ctID
=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2
NDBmY2Uy&rID=NTA5Mjkx; Kohl and Foy, Guide to the
Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool.
Akinwumi Adesina, “Keynote Presentation—Scale Up”
(video), Purdue University, September 26, 2018, https://
docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/opening/keynote/1/.
Kohl, Scaling Up of Sahel Rice Varieties in Senegal.
Purdue Improved Crop Storage, “Purdue Improved Crop
Storage (PICS)” (video), 2019, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu
/scaleup/opening/videos/3/.
PICS Newsletter 1, no. 1 (2015), https://picsnetwork.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NewsletterFinalsmall.pdf;
PICS Newsletter 2, no. 1 (2016), https://picsnetwork.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/newsletter_April_2016.pdf
“Developing Africa’s Seed Systems,” AGRA (website),
updated 2017, https://agra.org/program-development-and
-innovation/developing-africas-seed-systems/.
“Seeds for Impact Program,” AECF (website), accessed
February 28, 2019, https://www.aecfafrica.org/agriculture
/Seeds_for_Impact.
Kohl, Scaling Up of Agricultural Machinery in Bangladesh.
Babban Gona (website), accessed February 20, 2019, http://
www.babbangona.com/; Babban Gona, “Babban Gona
Wins Prestigious Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship” (video), 2017, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/
opening/videos/1/.
One Acre Fund (website), accessed February 20, 2019,
https://oneacrefund.org/.
Hello Tractor (website), accessed February 26, 2019,
https://www.hellotractor.com/home.
IFC, Access to Finance for Smallholder Farmers Learning from
the Experiences of Microfinance Institutions in Latin America
(IFC, 2014), iii, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/071
dd78045eadb5cb067b99916182e35/A2F+for+Smallholder
+Farmers-Final+English+Publication.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
Dalberg Global Development Advisors, Inflection Point:
Unlocking Growth in the Era of Farmer Finance (MasterCard
Foundation, Rural and Agricultural Finance Learning Lab,
2016), 2, https://www.raflearning.org/sites/default/files
/inflection_point_april_2016.pdf?token=OS8hc14U.
World Bank, Financing Agribusiness in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Investment Models (World
Bank, 2016), vii–viii, https://www.agrifinfacility.org/sites
/agrifin/files/Africa_Agrifinance_%202016.pdf.
“About CSAF,” Council on Smallholder Agricultural
Finance (website), accessed February 28, 2019, https://csaf
.org/about/.
USAID, Improving Food Security with Warehouse Receipts
(USAID, n.d.), https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sites/default
/files/success/files/Improving_Food_Security.pdf.

46. AFD, CTA, and IFAD, Study on Appropriate Warehousing and
Collateral Management Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (CTA,
2015), http://www.ruralfinanceandinvestment.org/node
/2038.
47. Philine Wehling and Bill Garthwaite, Designing Warehouse
Receipt Legislation: Regulatory Options and Recent Trends
(Rome: FAO, 2015), https://europa.eu/capacity4dev
/sorudev/documents/warehouse-receipt-systems-fao-2015.
48. Lamon Rutten et al., “The Use of Warehouse Receipt Finance
in Agriculture in Transition Countries” (FAO Investment
Centre working paper, presented at the World Grain Forum
2009), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lamon_Rutten
/publication/242578672_The_use_of_warehouse_receipt
_finance_in_agriculture_in_transition_countries/.
49. World Bank and IFC, Agricultural Insurance: Disaster Risk
Financing and Insurance Concept Note (World Bank, March
2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDISASTER
/Resources/AI_Concept_Final.pdf.
50. World Bank and IFC, Agricultural Insurance.
51. World Bank and IFC, Agricultural Insurance.
52. World Bank and IFC, Agricultural Insurance.
53. Nathaniel Jensen and Christopher Barrett, “Agricultural
Index Insurance for Development,” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 39, no. 2 (2017), 199–219, https://doi
.org/10.1093/aepp/ppw022.
54. Jensen and Barrett, “Agricultural Index Insurance for
Development.”
55. “Index-Based Livestock Insurance,” ILRI (website), accessed
February 28, 2019, https://ibli.ilri.org/.
56. Index Insurance Forum (website), Global Index Insurance
Facility, managed by the World Bank Group, accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.indexinsuranceforum.org/.
57. ISF Advisors, Protecting Growing Prosperity: Agricultural
Insurance in the Developing World (ISF Advisors, 2018), 15,
https://www.raflearning.org/post/protecting-growing
-prosperity-agricultural-insurance-the-developing-world
?platform=hootsuite.
58. Rauno Zander, Calvin Miller, and Nomathemba Mhlanga,
Credit Guarantee Systems for Agriculture and Rural Enterprise
Development (Rome: FAO, 2013), http://www.fao.org
/docrep/017/i3123e/i3123e00.pdf.
59. “African Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises,” African Development Bank Group (website),
accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.afdb.org/en/topics
-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-guarantee-fund
-for-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises/.
60. NIRSAL (website), accessed February 20, 2019, https://
www.nirsal.com/.
61. “FAQs,” NIRSAL (website), accessed February 20, 2019,
https://www.nirsal.com/faqs.php.
62. Root Capital, Financing Farm Renovation: How to Build
Resilience Using a Blend of Capital (Root Capital, 2016), 6,
https://rootcapital.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Root
-Capital-CFRI-Learning-Report-Full-Report.pdf.
63. “Blended Finance: The Fad for Mixing Public, Charitable
and Private Money,” Economist, April 23, 2016, http://

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

69.

70.

71.

72.
73.

74.

75.

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Trending_Blending_The
_Economist_April_23_2016.pdf.
AATIF (website), updated December 19, 2018, https://
www.aatif.lu/home.html.
Economist (April 23, 2016),“Blended Finance.”
Root Capital (website), accessed February 20, 2019,
https://rootcapital.org; Root Capital, Financing Farm
Renovation.
Root Capital (website); Root Capital, Financing Farm
Renovation.
“Rice Cultivation in Nigeria—The Olam Ondorie Nucleus
Rice Farm” (blog post), Proshare, February 07, 2017,
https://www.proshareng.com/news/Agriculture/Rice
-Cultivation-in-Nigeria---The-OLAM-ONDORIE-NUCLEUS
-Rice-Farm/33686.
UN, Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP) Partnership with Olam (UN, April 22, 2018), https://www.un.org
/esa/ffd/ffdforum/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/04
/Backgroud-Paper_IFAD-VCDP-OLAM-Farmers
-Partnership.pdf.
“Success of the Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program”
(video), USAID, October 02, 2014, https://www.usaid.gov
/news-information/videos/advanced-maize-seed-adoption
-program.
DuPont Pioneer, “Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program
Helps More Than 100,000 Ethiopia Farmers Enhance Their
Income and Transform Production,” press release, May 3,
2017, https://www.pioneer.com/home/site/about/news
-media/news-releases/template.CONTENT/guid.35587637
-9810-29CD-F38C-2D7E336DF225.
World Bank and IFC, Agricultural Insurance.
“What is impact investing?,” Global Impact Investing Network (website), accessed February 20, 2019, https://thegiin
.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#what-is-impact
-investing.
Syngenta Foundation, “Scaling Potato Seed Production in
East Africa” (video), 2018, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu
/scaleup/opening/videos/2/.
“Quality Seed Potato Enables Farmers to Move Beyond
Poverty in Africa,” in Annual Report 2017 (CIP International
Potato Center, 2017), https://cipotato.org/annualreport
2017/media/quality-seed-potato-helps-farmers-move
-beyond-poverty-in-africa/.
Justin Ahmed et al., Potato Seed Impact Study Report: Interim
Study Report on the Impact of Adopting Certified Potato Seed
in Meru County, Kenya (2011–2014) (Syngenta Foundation,
2014), https://www.syngentafoundation.org/file/2916
/download?token=S9YXp7es.
Simon Winter, SFSA, personal communication.
Babban Gona (website).
Babban Gona (website).
Willy Foote, “Meet the Nigerian Entrepreneur Depriving Boko Haram of New Recruits,” Forbes, May 30, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyfoote/2018/05/30/meetthe-nigerian-entrepreneur-depriving-boko-haram-of-newrecruits/#771c047645b8.

NOTES

|

33

81. “Countries We Serve,” One Acre Fund (website), accessed
March 25, 2019, https://oneacrefund.org/impact/.
82. Liana Barcia, “How the One Acre Fund Became a $50M
Social Enterprise,” Devex, October 16, 2015, https://www
.devex.com/news/how-the-one-acre-fund-became-a-50m
-social-enterprise-87098.
83. David Hong, “One Acre Fund Testifies Before House
Foreign Affairs Committee,” One Acre Fund (website),
October 7, 2015, https://oneacrefund.org/blog/one-acre
-fund-testifies-house-foreign-affairs-committee/.
84. Johannes Linn, “Session 4 Laying the Foundations for Successful Scaling” (video), September 27, 2018, https://docs
.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/foundations/overview/1.
85. Kohl, Scaling Up of Agricultural Machinery in Bangladesh.
86. Root Capital, Financing Farm Renovation.
87. Root Capital, Financing Farm Renovation, 15.
88. Murat Sartas et al., “Effects of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms
on Multi-Stakeholder Innovation Networks: Implications
for Research for Development Interventions Targeting
Innovations at Scale,” PLoS ONE 13(6) (2018): e0197993,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197993.
89. Dieuwke Lamers et al., “Compositional Dynamics of Multilevel Innovation Platforms in Agricultural Research for
Development,” Science and Public Policy 44, no. 6 (2017):
739–752, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scx009.
90. Adesina, “Keynote Presentation.”
91. David Spielman, “Public Policy Solutions to Advance the
Scaling Agenda” (PowerPoint presentation, September
2018), https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/foundations
/overview/1; David Spielman, “Session 4 Laying the
Foundations for Successful Scaling” (video), September 27,
2018, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/foundations
/overview/1/.
92. Joseph Mulambu et al., “Iron Beans in Rwanda: Crop
Development and Delivery Experience,” African Journal
of Food, Agriculture, Nutrition and Development 17, no. 2
(2017): 12026-12050, https://www.researchgate.net
/publication/318468536_Iron_beans_in_Rwanda_Crop
_development_and_delivery_experience.
93. Danielle Resnick, “The Political Economy of Food Price
Policy in Senegal,” in Food Price Policy in an Era of Market
Instability: A Political Economy Analysis, ed. Per PinstrupAndersen (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014), http://www
.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso
/9780198718574.001.0001/acprof-9780198718574
-chapter-14.
94. Kohl, Scaling Up of Sahel Rice Varieties in Senegal.
95. Mikhail Miklyaev, Majid Hashemi, and Melani Schultz,
“Cost Benefit Analysis of Senegal’s Rice Value Chains,”
(Development Discussion Paper, Cambridge Resources
International, 2017), https://cri-world.com/publications
/qed_dp_301.pdf.
96. World Economic Forum and Bain & Company, “Nigerian
Cassava Flour: Broadening Value Chains for Traditional
Crops,” in Enabling Trade: From Farm to Fork (World Economic Forum, 2014), http://reports.weforum.org/enabling

34

|

NOTES

97.
98.

99.

100.
101.
102.

103.
104.

105.
106.

107.

108.
109.

110.

111.

112.

-trade-from-valuation-to-action/enabling-trade-from-farm
-to-fork/a6-case-studies-f2f/nigerian-cassava-flour
-broadening-value-chains-for-traditional-crops/.
World Economic Forum and Bain & Company, “Nigerian
Cassava Flour.”
Grow Africa, Fertilizer Subsidy Reform Revives Nigeria’s Agriculture: Case Studies on Public-Private Agriculture Investments
(Grow Africa, n.d.), 4, https://www.growafrica.com/sites
/default/files/fertilizer-subsidy-reform-web.pdf.
Katrin Kuhlman and Yuan Zhou, “Seed Policy Harmonization in the EAC and COMESA: The Case of Kenya”
(working paper, Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable
Agriculture, September 2015), 3, https://www.syngenta
foundation.org/sites/g/files/zhg576/f/seeds_policy_kenya
_case_study_sept15_0.pdf.
Kuhlman and Zhou, “Seed Policy Harmonization,” 3.
Trademark is pending for SeedAssure.
Jérôme Bossuet, “In Your Seeds I Trust: African Seed Companies Test the SeedAssure Application,” CIMMYT (website), October 11, 2018, https://www.cimmyt.org/in-your
-seeds-i-trust-african-seed-companies-test-the-seedassure
-application/.
Population Media Center (website), accessed February 21,
2019, https://www.populationmedia.org/.
“PMC Has Helped More Than 500 Million People,” Population Media Center (website), accessed February 21, 2019,
https://www.populationmedia.org/our-approach/impact/.
Kuza Biashara (website), accessed February 21, 2019, http://
www.kuzabiashara.co.ke.
“Who We Are,” Shamba Shape Up (website), accessed February 21, 2019, https://shambashapeup.com/about/who
-we-are/.
Shamba Shape Up, series 7, episode 16, “Conservation Agriculture, Mangoes, Water Testing,” aired [n.d.] on Citizen TV
Kenya, https://shambashapeup.com/series/series-7/ep-16
-conservation-agriculture-mangoes-water-testing/.
Digital Green (website), accessed February 21, 2019, http://
www.digitalgreen.org.
CIMMYT and CORTEVA, “Collaboration in Mexico”
(PowerPoint presentation, June 8, 2018), https://docs.lib.
purdue.edu/scaleup/marketfinance/markets/1/.
Jane Nelson and Beth Jenkins, Tackling Global Challenges:
Lessons in System Leadership from the World Economic Forum’s
New Vision for Agriculture Initiative (Harvard Kennedy
School, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default
/files/centers/mrcbg/files/NVAReport.pdf.
“It says something that it took so much work and so many
experts to identify so few documented cases of interventions that scaled successfully and sustainably.” Mark Huisenga, remarks at Purdue University Scale Up Conference,
September 2018.
This framework was developed under the auspices of the
Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group of the Community of Practice on Scaling Development Outcomes
(email: scalingCOP@msi-inc.com).

113. Juxtaposed with this is the all-too-common practice of rigid
adherence to initial plans, as illustrated by this example
cited by Dr. Robert Bertram, the Chief Innovation Officer
in USAID’s Bureau for Food Security: “I recall a visit in
Nepal where we our partners were indeed taking a systems
approach around rice, wheat and lentils. Yet in the field,
it was clear that chickpea was the legume of choice. When
I suggested including that, apparently the contract didn’t
allow for them to do so, and changing it was not easy.” Prepared remarks at Purdue University Scale Up Conference,
September 25, 2018.
114. Recent case studies and feedback from scaling experts suggest that it is possible to do a much better job integrating
monitoring and evaluation with the data needs of commercial partners that focus on sales, distribution, transaction
costs, and profitability.
115. AGRA (website), accessed February 26, 2019, https://agra
.org/; [Joe DeVries], [“Africa’s Private Sector-Led Seed Revolution”] (PowerPoint presentation, Purdue University Scale
Up Conference, September 2018), https://docs.lib.purdue
.edu/scaleup/assessing/casestudies/1/.
116. iDE-B (website), accessed February 26, 2019, https://www
.ideglobal.org/country/bangladesh; [Tim Prewitt],
“Machinery Learning: Translating Assessment into Adaptation toward Scale in Agriculture Mechanization and
Beyond” (PowerPoint presentation, Purdue University Scale
Up Conference, September 26, 2018), https://docs
.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/assessing/casestudies/4/; CIMMYT
(website), accessed February 26, 2019, https://www.cimmyt
.org/; Lennart Woltering and Jelle Van Loon, “Scaling
Appropriate Agricultural Mechanization World-Wide: TwoWheel Tractors and Smallholders Farmers” (PowerPoint
presentation, Purdue University Scale Up Conference,
September 2018), https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup
/examples/casestudies/3.
117. [Rebecka Lundgren], Promising Practices in Scale-Up Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation: A Compendium of Resources
(Institute for Reproductive Health, Georgetown University,
2013), http://irh.org/scale-up-mle-compendium-of
-resources/.
118. “Millions Learning,” Brookings Institution (website),
accessed March 4, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/series
/millions-learning/.

119. Larry Cooley and Isabel Guerrero, The Broken Part of the
Business Model in Taking Development Outcomes to Scale (MSI
and Imago Global Grassroots, 2017), http://msiscalingup
.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/BrokenPart
_revised_5.pdf.
120. Arntraud Hartmann et al., “Scaling Up the Fight Against
Rural Poverty: An Institutional Review of IFAD’s Approach”
(Global Economy and Development Working Paper No.
43, Brookings Institution, 2010), http://www.brookings
.edu/research/papers/2010/10/ifad-linn-kharas.
121. Arntraud Hartmann et al., “Scaling Up Programs for the
Rural Poor: IFAD’s Experience, Lessons and Prospects (Phase
2)” (Global Economy and Development Working Paper No.
54, Brookings Institution, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu
/research/papers/2013/01/ifad-rural-poor-kharas-linn.
122. IFAD, IFAD’s Support to Scaling Up of Results: An Evaluation
Synthesis (IFAD, 2017), https://www.ifad.org/documents
/38714182/39721352/Scaling+Up+ESR+-+Final+report+for
+web.pdf/.
123. Linn et al., “Scaling Up the Fight Against Rural Poverty.”
124. IFAD, IFAD’s Institutional Efficiency and Efficiency of IFADFunded Operations (IFAD, 2013), https://www.ifad.org
/documents/38714182/39711115/efficiency_full.pdf
/a781120f-3b52-493d-833a-e8d7fc1075ee.
125. Relevant documentation: “Scaling-up results,” IFAD (website), accessed February 21, 2019, https://www.ifad.org/en
/scaling-up-results; Linn et al., “Scaling Up the Fight
Against Rural Poverty”; Hartmann et al., “Scaling Up Programs for the Rural Poor”; IFAD, IFAD’s Operational Framework; IFAD, IFAD’s Support to Scaling Up of Results; IFAD,
Scaling Up in Agriculture and Rural Development (IFAD, September 2018), https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170
/39155737/Scaling+up+in+agriculture_infographics.pdf.
126. Eleanor Crook Foundation, Grantee Guidance Series: Theory
of Sustainability and Theory of Scale (Eleanor Crook Foundation, October 2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/551db914e4b0998e40bbd10d/t/5bc518a971c10b9813d5
c1e6/1539643577159/ecf-grantee-guidance_Oct2018.pdf.
127. GIZ, Task Force on Scaling: Achieving Widespread Adoption of
Innovations from Agricultural Research (GIZ, 2018), https://
cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/97465.

NOTES

|

35

LARRY COOLEY is Founder and President Emeritus of MSI, a Tetra
Tech company. He directed for 11 years the multi-country Implementing Policy Change program and has been involved since 2003
in developing and applying a management framework and set of
tools for assessing scalability and accelerating the scaling of development outcomes through public sector and commercial pathways. He has supported more than 100 scaling efforts in a variety of
sectors; served as the scaling advisor to the MacArthur Foundation’s
100&Change competition; and is founder and curator, with Johannes
Linn, of the Global Community of Practice on Scaling Development
Outcomes. Larry is the current Chair of the Governing Council of the
Society for International Development and serves on the Boards of
Directors of the National Academy of Public Administration, ELMA
Philanthropies, and World Learning. Larry holds graduate degrees from Columbia University, Princeton
University, and the Cranfield Institute of Technology in the UK.

JULIE HOWARD is an independent consultant on international
development issues with a focus on agricultural development,
youth employment, and sub-Saharan Africa. She is Senior Adviser
(non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
serves on the Board of Directors for the World Vegetable Center and
the Somali Agriculture Technical Group, and is a member of the
Initiative for Global Development’s Council of Advisers. From 2015
to 2018, she was senior adviser to the associate provost and dean
for international studies and programs at Michigan State University.
From 2011 to 2014, Dr. Howard served as the first chief scientist in
the Bureau for Food Security at USAID and as senior adviser to the
USAID administrator on agricultural research, extension, and education. At USAID, Dr. Howard directed the research, policy, and human
and institutional capacity development programs of Feed the Future. Before joining USAID, Dr. Howard
served from 2003 to 2011 as chief executive officer for the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in
Africa. She holds a B.A. from the George Washington University and a Ph.D. in agricultural economics
from Michigan State University.

